UN Peace Operations and Conflicting Legitimacies

Billerbeck, Sarah B. K. von

doi:10.1080/17502977.2017.1353751

Cited by 22 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Fundamentally, international peace intervention strategies and efforts are often based on assumptions of linearity and causality that are incongruent with the complex, relational and systemic nature of the contexts in question (Benitez‐Schaefer, 2015; von Billerbeck, 2017). These approaches to conflict response fail to capture the dynamics of complex peacebuilding systems (de Coning et al., 2016), including adaptation and resistance by both locals and international peacebuilders, non‐proportionality, and emergence of new ideas and preferences, or the notion that ‘macroproperties emerge from microinteractions’ often in unpredictable ways (Hendrick, 2009, p. 7).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The End of the Liberal World Order and the Future of UN Peace Operations: Lessons Learned

Cassin

Zyla

2021

Global Policy

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Global conflicts are becoming increasingly transnational and often involve non‐state actors. These trends mirror the diffusion of power that has resulted from globalization and the erosion of liberal hegemony since the late 1990s and early 2000s. Though projections vary among scholars, the future international system is likely to involve a diversification of actors exerting influence in all policy spheres, including conflict‐response and peace operations. The United Nations (UN) and other liberal actors, historically dominant in peace operations, must adapt to remain relevant in a future where their governance of operations, and the underlying liberal democratic goals on which they are based, can no longer be assumed. In light of this waning liberal international order, this paper examines the core lessons learned from the past 70 years of UN peace operations to infer what future UN peacekeeping might look like and what adaptations will be necessary for this new environment. In so doing, we prepare recommendations for a truly localized and contextualized approach to peace operations that is expansive, representative and non‐directive, ultimately necessitating the UN and other liberal actors to adopt higher risk tolerance and relinquish exclusive control over conflict‐response and peace.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The End of the Liberal World Order and the Future of UN Peace Operations: Lessons Learned

Cassin

Zyla

2021

Global Policy

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“…Research on the subject began to grow in the 1990s (Franck 1990;Held 1995;Niedermeyer and Sinnott 1995;Hurd 1999;Scharpf 1999). A fuller theorization of legitimacy and legitimation in world politics unfolded after the turn of the millennium (Clark 2005Steffek 2003Steffek , 2004Zu ¨rn 2004;Buchanan and Keohane 2006;Clark and Reus-Smit 2007;Hurd 2007;Hurrelmann et al 2007;Black 2008;Chapman 2009;Mayntz 2010;Nullmeier et al 2010;Quack 2010;Bernstein 2011;Brassett and Tsingou 2011;Zaum 2013;Bexell 2015;Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015;Gronau and Schmidtke 2016;Sabrow 2017;Lenz and Viola 2017;Oates 2017;von Billerbeck 2017;Whalan 2017). Recent years have brought important synthesizing work, so that we are now well placed systematically to examine the meaning, sources, processes, and consequences of legitimacy in global governance (Tallberg et al 2018;Zu ¨rn 2018;Tallberg and Zu ¨rn 2019;Dingwerth et al 2019;.…”

Section: State Of the Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

Citizens, Elites, and the Legitimacy of Global Governance

Dellmuth

Scholte

Tallberg

et al. 2022

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Contemporary society has witnessed major growth in global governance, yet the legitimacy of global governance remains deeply in question. This book offers the first full comparative investigation of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Empirically, it provides a comprehensive analysis of public and elite opinion toward global governance, building on two uniquely coordinated surveys covering multiple countries and international organizations. Theoretically, it develops an individual-level approach, exploring how a person’s characteristics in respect of socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust shape legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. The book’s central findings are threefold. First, there is a notable and general elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. While elites on average hold moderately high levels of legitimacy toward international organizations, the general public is decidedly more skeptical. Second, individual-level differences in interests, values, identities, and trust dispositions provide significant drivers of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, as well as the gap between the two groups. Most important on the whole are differences in the extent to which citizens and elites trust domestic political institutions, which shape how these groups assess the legitimacy of international organizations. Third, both patterns and sources of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs vary across organizations and countries. These variations suggest that institutional and societal contexts condition attitudes toward global governance. The book’s findings shed light on future opportunities and constraints in international cooperation, suggesting that current levels of legitimacy point neither to a general crisis of global governance nor to a general readiness for its expansion.

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“…In the 1990s, the notion of ownership started to figure prominently in the development programmes of the World Bank (World Bank , p. 6), the International Monetary Fund (Khan and Sharma ), the OECD (, pp. 53–54), as well as in the UN peace operation programmes (Wilén , p. 340; von Billerbeck ). Just a few years later, the EU also used similar rhetoric in its external policies vis‐à‐vis accessing states (Kelley ; Bengtsson ; Coman ).…”

Section: Ownership and The European Semestermentioning

confidence: 99%

Macro‐economic coordination and elusive ownership in the European Union

Vanheuverzwijn

Crespy

2018

Public Administration

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The notion of ownership is well known in relation to global governance. In the realm of EU macro‐economic coordination, it has become a buzzword since the revamping process of the European Semester in 2015. This article investigates how ownership by four types of domestic actors (governments, administrations, parliaments and social partners) manifests itself in the European Semester. We conceptualize three types of ownership, namely institutional, political, and cognitive. Using network analysis, semi‐structured interviews, and a small‐scale survey, we find that ownership is strongest among governments and administrations which are able to shape the outputs of the European Semester (institutional ownership) with little political disagreement (political ownership). While national parliaments display low levels of all types of ownership, employers and unions exhibit relatively strong cognitive ownership. We conclude that the European Semester remains a bureaucratic process contributing to building a multi‐level administrative space rather than an arena for political debates.

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UN Peace Operations and Conflicting Legitimacies

Cited by 22 publications

References 35 publications

The End of the Liberal World Order and the Future of UN Peace Operations: Lessons Learned

The End of the Liberal World Order and the Future of UN Peace Operations: Lessons Learned

Citizens, Elites, and the Legitimacy of Global Governance

Macro‐economic coordination and elusive ownership in the European Union

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