(Un-)Heiliger spread: Zur öffentlichen Sakralisierung finanzwirtschaftlicher Indikatoren

Tognato, Carlo

doi:10.1007/978-3-531-19707-4_6

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…This contributed to transmogrifying the financial crisis in Europe into a series of national problems of EMU member states. In the case of Italy, for instance, Tognato (2014) has argued that the urgency with which the development of sovereign debt marketability was publicly discussed, constantly monitoring the spread between interest rates for Italian and for German bonds, could be paralleled with a quasi-religious invocation affecting the core of societal identity constructions. What happened was a ‘societal securitization’ that took issue with the financial, but also cultural, credibility and creditworthiness of an Italian identity in the face of the sovereign debt crisis, and in constant comparison with another nation’s seemingly much stronger identity and creditworthiness.…”

Section: Market Interference In Political Securitizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Securities markets and political securitization: The case of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone

Langenohl

2017

Security Dialogue

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What were the effects of securities markets’ dynamics on the issue of political securitization, in the sense of the Copenhagen School, in the context of the sovereign debt crisis in the European Monetary Union (EMU)? This article addresses that question in an attempt to bring together the theory of political securitization and the financial securitization of government bonds. In conceptual terms, the article argues that the intervention of securities markets into the securitization of the euro can be understood as a confrontation between two types of validity claims. Securitizing moves, and the response they elicit, together constitute symbolically a political collectivity; this provokes a struggle between the adequate representation of that collectivity and its security concerns. In contrast to this, market communications – in fact, price signals – neither invoke a political collectivity nor can they be semantically refuted. Because of this quality, market signals can amplify or weaken securitizing moves. In the case of the EMU sovereign debt crisis, market communications triggered a privileging of supranational securitizations while impairing national ones.

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Section: Market Interference In Political Securitizationmentioning

confidence: 99%