“…That the Population of the world, or, in other words, the number of persons inhabiting it, is limited only by moral or physical evil, or by fear of a deficiency 1 At least, this question was treated by Dugald Stewart during the Lectures on Political Economy he delivered at the University of Edinburgh as soon as 1799 (1854-60, 8, pp. xi-xiv), and Hutchison (1998). of those articles of wealth which the habits of the individuals of each class of its inhabitants lead them to require. i-xlvi), by Thomas Robert Malthus in the Introduction of his Principles of Political Economy (1820, pp.…”
Section: Senior On the Methods Of Political Economymentioning
This paper reconsiders the supposed agreement of David Ricardo and William Nassau Senior on the question of the method of political economy. The first part shows that Senior was very critical about Ricardo's approach to economic phenomena and considered that this question of method had important consequences on theoretical points. The second part analyzes the way Ricardo was dealing with economics. It shows that though Senior was right in considering that their respective methods were different and led to important analytical divergences, he nevertheless misunderstood Ricardo's method with a hypotheticodeductive one. The consequence is that Senior's criticisms on Ricardo's theories of rent, natural wages, and of the tendencies of agricultural returns to decrease and of profit to fall are ill-founded, being based on a misunderstanding of the way they were established.
“…That the Population of the world, or, in other words, the number of persons inhabiting it, is limited only by moral or physical evil, or by fear of a deficiency 1 At least, this question was treated by Dugald Stewart during the Lectures on Political Economy he delivered at the University of Edinburgh as soon as 1799 (1854-60, 8, pp. xi-xiv), and Hutchison (1998). of those articles of wealth which the habits of the individuals of each class of its inhabitants lead them to require. i-xlvi), by Thomas Robert Malthus in the Introduction of his Principles of Political Economy (1820, pp.…”
Section: Senior On the Methods Of Political Economymentioning
This paper reconsiders the supposed agreement of David Ricardo and William Nassau Senior on the question of the method of political economy. The first part shows that Senior was very critical about Ricardo's approach to economic phenomena and considered that this question of method had important consequences on theoretical points. The second part analyzes the way Ricardo was dealing with economics. It shows that though Senior was right in considering that their respective methods were different and led to important analytical divergences, he nevertheless misunderstood Ricardo's method with a hypotheticodeductive one. The consequence is that Senior's criticisms on Ricardo's theories of rent, natural wages, and of the tendencies of agricultural returns to decrease and of profit to fall are ill-founded, being based on a misunderstanding of the way they were established.
“…Instead, inner experience (intuition or introspection) or pure reason are granted a privileged role. 9 See (Hutchison 1998) for a history of ultra-deductivism. His major point of criticism against apriorist positions is their use of unrealistic claims about the knowledge of the acting individuals and the ensuing problems to discuss disequilibria.…”
Section: The Extent Of a Priori Knowledge According To Misesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For the case of Mises, see(Scheall 2017a); for aprioristic positions in the history of economic methodology see(Hutchison 1998). GivenRobbins's (1932) paramount and lasting impact on the discipline and considering that his apriorism unequivocally relies on intuition, the orthodoxy's comparatively harsh opposition to Mises' apriorism is somewhat unexpected.Latsis (1976, pp.…”
Current debates between behavioural and orthodox economists indicate that the role and epistemological status of first principles is a particularly pressing problem in economics. As an alleged paragon of extreme apriorism, the methodology of Austrian economics in Mises' tradition is often dismissed as untenable in the light of modern philosophy. In particular, the defence of the so-called fundamental axiom of praxeology-"Man acts."-by means of pure intuition is almost unanimously rejected. However, in recently resurfacing debates, the extremeness of Mises' epistemological position has been called into question. Rather than directly engaging in these exegetical discussions, this paper aims to substantiate the possibility and plausibility of conventionalist defences of praxeology per se. The proposed shift includes settling for an analytic fundamental axiom and acknowledging the prima facie tenability of other research programs than praxeology. Since conventionalist praxeology is only moderately aprioristic, mainstream economists and philosophers might be more likely to engage in fruitful discussions with those Austrian scholars who elaborate pragmatic arguments for praxeology instead of invoking pure intuition.
“…15 It is perhaps best to interpret these chapters of PPE as an argument to the effect that methodological apriorism is neither necessary nor suffi cient to establish-and, indeed, is ultimately counter to-the political principles dear to most Austrians. 15 See, e.g., Hutchison ( 1938 ) and, more recently, Hutchison ( 1998 ). priori knowledge of the sort asserted by some Austrians are undermined by the fact that they are utterly unconvincing to those who either do not judge themselves in possession of an intuitive access to the invisible "facts" of the world, or, who, alternatively, do deem themselves so equipped, but who happen to intuit different "facts" about some world purportedly inaccessible to observation. 14 For a related argument, see Hutchison (1938, pp.…”
Section: Hutchison On Mises and "Hayek I"mentioning
The paper argues that Terence Hutchison's ( 1981 ) argument that the young F. A. Hayek maintained a methodological position markedly similar to that of Ludwig von Mises fails to support the relevant conclusion. The fi rst problem with Hutchison's argument is that it is not clear exactly what conclusion he meant to establish. Mises (in)famously maintained a rather extreme methodological apriorism. However, the concept of a priori knowledge that emerges from Hayek's epistemology as implied in his work on theoretical psychology is the opposite of Mises's treatment of a priori knowledge. Thus, it cannot be maintained-if, indeed, Hutchison meant to establish-that Hayek was a Misesian apriorist during the years in question. What's more, the paper shows that Hutchison's argument does not support a weaker interpretation of the relevant conclusion. There are alternative interpretations of Hutchison's evidence, more charitable and more consistent with Hayek's epistemology, which undermine Hutchison's conclusion.
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