ULRAS: Ultra-Lightweight RFID Authentication Scheme for Mobile Device

Fan, Kai; Ge, Nan; Gong, Yanyun; Li, Hui; Su, Ruidan

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-21837-3_12

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The third class is called lightweight, includes RNG functions and CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Code) checksums [2] . Finally, ultra-lightweight is the last classification, limited to the usage of simple bitwise operators such as AND, OR and XOR [11] . Paying attention to the mentioned classification, several protocols have been presented in the last few years [4,12,13] .…”

Section: Journal Of Communications and Information Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yoon [11] no no yes yes no no no UISRS [13] no no no no no no no our protocol yes yes yes yes yes yes yes w 1 : Secret parameter reveal resistance w 2 : Protection from replay attack w 3 : Protection from impersonation attack w 4 : Prevention from DoS attack w 5 : Prevention from traceability attack w 6 : Prevention from forward traceability attack w 7 : Prevention from backward traceability attack…”

Section: Performance Analysis Of Our Proposed Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cryptanalysis and improvement of two new RFID protocols based on R-RAPSE

Sajjadi

Haghbin

Mirmohseni

2017

J. Commun. Inf. Netw.

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RFID (Radio Frequency IDentification) is a pioneer technology which has depicted a new lifestyle for humanity. Nowadays we observe an increase in the number of RFID applications and no one can ignore their numerous usage. An important issue with RFID systems is providing privacy requirements of these systems during authentication. Recently in 2014, Cai et al. proposed two improved RFID authentication protocols based on R-RAPS (RFID Authentication Protocol Security Enhanced Rules). We investigate the privacy of their protocols based on Ouafi and Phan privacy model and show that these protocols cannot provide private authentication for RFID users. Moreover, we show that these protocols are vulnerable to impersonation, DoS and traceability attacks. Moreover, we present two improved efficient and secure authentication protocols to ameliorate the performance of Cai et al.'s schemes. Our analysis illustrates that the existing weaknesses of the discussed protocols are eliminated in our proposed protocols.

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