UCAVs-Technological, Policy, and Operational Challenges

Abstract

Promise and ChallengesUnmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) have the earmarks of becoming one of the disruptive technologies that transform conventional military operations across the full spectrum of combat scenarios from peacekeeping to regional wars. In battle, forces engage an adversary by either direct combat or indirect fires. Indirect fires, or standoff engagements, preserve forces and are preferred whenever available and effective. UCAVs promise to carry the concept of indirect fires to a new level. They will be more flexible than missiles in time-sensitive target selection and more readily expendable in high-risk environments than manned systems, and they will have a greater sustained battle presence than either missiles or manned systems. In time, UCAVs may liberate manned systems (such as airborne warning and control systems [AWACS] or joint surveillance and target attack radar systems [JSTARS]) from such routine missions as command, control, and communications protection or carrier battle group air cover. They may also perform a majority of the sorties for long endurance operations, such as Northern Watch and Southern Watch over Iraq. Eventually UCAVs may be so sophisticated that they will be safer than manned systems for close support of ground forces and more successful than manned aircraft in air-to-air combat. They could someday join the air defense arsenal against either strategic ballistic missiles or cruise missiles.The intersection of technology advances, national security policy, and operational requirements has led to the commitment to OverviewThe Bush administration and Congress are in concert on the goal of developing a fleet of unmanned aircraft that can reduce both defense costs and aircrew losses in combat by taking on at least the most dangerous combat missions. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) will be neither inexpensive enough to be readily expendable nor-at least in early development-capable of performing every combat mission alongside or in lieu of manned sorties. Yet the tremendous potential of such systems is widely recognized, and allies as well as potential adversaries are moving quickly to mount their own research and development programs. The United States is committed to fielding UCAV capabilities by 2010, principally for the missions of suppression of enemy air defense and deep strike, which are among the highest risk tasks for the Air Force and naval aviation.Currently, UCAVs are unproven, infant technologies just being designed, simulated, and demonstrated. Enthusiasts must be aware that significant technological, policy, and operational challenges must be met. An operational UCAV capability is not expected to be available to U.S. field and fleet commanders for 10 years. Yet a nexus of mature technologies, policy support, and operational needs has been reached, and it is both possible and necessary to accelerate development of UCAVs. Their potential is apparent, and there is sustained momentum behind programs for all the services.

Building a Better WarBot: Ethical Issues in the Design of Unmanned Systems for Military Applications

“…As far as is possible, they should not expose their operators to enemy line-of-sight fire. They must be capable of combined operations with manned systems during military exercises and wartime and also of being used for training and in peacetime operations alongside civilian systems (Barry and Zimet 2001;Hockmuth 2007, p. 73). This requirement is especially burdensome on UCAVs and UAVs which must be capable of sharing airspace with both military and civilian aircraft (Hockmuth 2007;Kenyon 2006;Kochan 2005;Lazarski 2002;Wise 2007).…”

“…Building a Better WarBot 171 accidents (Barry and Zimet 2001;Kenyon 2006, p. 44). They must be capable of reliable ''friend or foe'' identification in order to avoid causing casualties by ''friendly fire'' (Kainikara 2002;Marks 2006).…”

“…Thus, for instance, the use of UMS in bomb and IED disposal and mine clearance is not merely ethical but ethically mandated where possible-even with existing systems. Similarly, once they develop the capacity, UMS may quickly become the option of choice for conducting suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions (Barry and Zimet 2001;Mustin 2002; Office of the Secretary of Defense 2005b; Appendix A; Peterson 2005;Sullivan 2006).…”

UAV Swarm Control: Calculating Digital Pheromone Fields with the GPU

“…The operator has the camera pointing out the front of the plane, but he really has lost a lot of situational awareness that a normal pilot would have of where the ground is and where the attitude of his aircraft is." (Charles et al, 2001) Predator operators liken piloting it to flying as though looking through a soda straw (Grant, 2002). If it takes at least two people to control one Predator it would take thousands of people to control one swarm of a thousand Predators.…”

Three-Dimensional Path Planning of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Using Particle Swarm Optimization

“…The method described allows a human operator to focus on selecting an appropriate path from a set of alternate paths produced by the path planner, easing the decision making process. Using a Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm, the task of generating alternate paths is formulated into an optimization problem consisting of two main components: 1) for UAVs to avoid obstacles such as threats (e.g., surface to air missile sites, tanks, and aircraft) and 2) maintaining a fuel-efficient path to maximize mission range.…”