U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Iran: Undermined by External Factors

Kozhanov, Nikolay

doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00504.x

Cited by 19 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 2 publications

(2 reference statements)

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“…These sanctions, while evidently not halting Iran's enrichment program, 'have helped to restrict Iran's ability to employ its advanced centrifuges in larger numbers' by limiting Iran's ability to procure critical 'choke-point' items such as the maraging steel necessary for centrifuge construction (Esfandiary and Fitzpatrick 2011, 148). This 'success' is countered by Tehran's relatively successful diversification of its sources of imported petroleum beyond the largely Western-based multinationals that were affected by the sanctions (Becker and Nixon 2010;Dombey 2010;Kozhanov 2012). Given that the Islamic Republic has endured various levels of US economic sanctions for the majority of its existence without a significant modifying effect on its international behaviour, it is unclear how this balance sheet will sway the regime to change tack.…”

Section: The Strategic Implications Of Iran's Nuclear Motivationsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Iran as a ‘pariah’ nuclear aspirant

Clarke¹

2013

Australian Journal of International Affairs

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Section: The Strategic Implications Of Iran's Nuclear Motivationsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Iran as a ‘pariah’ nuclear aspirant

Clarke¹

2013

Australian Journal of International Affairs

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“…Pada klaster kedua, literatur terdahulu membahas faktor-faktor yang dapat menghambat atau menjadi tantangan dari penerapan sanksi AS terhadap Iran, seperti karakteristik unilateral dari sanksi AS itu sendiri, tindakan balasan yang dilakukan oleh Iran, juga kebijakan keamanan Iran (Maloney, 2010). Selain itu, terdapat beberapa faktor eksternal yang juga dapat menghambat efektivitas sanksi AS seperti perilaku mitra dagang utama Iran dalam menanggapi sanksi AS, kesiapan kawan-kawan AS untuk menegakkan sanksi AS atau memberlakukan sanksinya sendiri terhadap Iran, serta adanya negara-negara yang memainkan peran 'black knights' (Kozhanov, 2011). Sedangkan faktor domestik di Iran seperti ideologi dan doktrin rezim (Takeyh & Maloney, 2011;Majidpour, 2013), struktur kekuatan politik domestik (Borszik, 2015), serta perkembangan teknologi (Majidpour, 2013), juga masih menjadi kendala utama yang dihadapi oleh AS dalam menerapkan sanksi terhadap Iran.…”

Section: Pendahuluanunclassified

Post JCPOA

Rahim¹

2019

Jurnal ICMES

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This paper analyzes the effectiveness of U.S.’ coercive diplomacy policy towards Iran carried out through the (re)implementation of sanctions regime after its withdrawal from the so called multilateral agreement ‘JCPOA’ on 8 May 2018. Unsatisfied with the terms of the Agreement, the U.S. administration decided to pull out from the Agreement and immediately implemented sanctions regime against Tehran. Despite the significance of previous studies regarding U.S.’ implementation of sanctions against Iran, I did not found any study that used a specific theory to indicate factors or conditions favoring the success of U.S. sanctions against Iran. In particular, I did not found any literature that analyzes the effectiveness U.S.’ sanctions against Iran after its withdrawal from JCPOA using a specific theory. This paper will fill that gap in the literature by examining the case study using a theory-driven research. The Analytical framework that I apply in this paper is coercive diplomacy theory developed by Tom Sauer which I elaborate into five main variables: objective, demand, threat, time-pressure, and motivation. By examining those factors, this paper argues that U.S.’ coercive diplomacy policy against Iran has been ineffective because of the lack of U.S.’ calculation and considerations to the five variables.This paper analyzes the effectiveness of U.S.’ coercive diplomacy policy towards Iran carried out through the (re)implementation of sanctions regime after its withdrawal from the so called multilateral agreement ‘JCPOA’ on 8 May 2018. Unsatisfied with the terms of the Agreement, the U.S. administration decided to pull out from the Agreement and immediately implemented sanctions regime against Tehran. Despite the significance of previous studies regarding U.S.’ implementation of sanctions against Iran, I did not found any study that used a specific theory to indicate factors or conditions favoring the success of U.S. sanctions against Iran. In particular, I did not found any literature that analyzes the effectiveness U.S.’ sanctions against Iran after its withdrawal from JCPOA using a specific theory. This paper will fill that gap in the literature by examining the case study using a theory-driven research. The Analytical framework that I apply in this paper is coercive diplomacy theory developed by Tom Sauer which I elaborate into five main variables: objective, demand, threat, time-pressure, and motivation. By examining those factors, this paper argues that U.S.’ coercive diplomacy policy against Iran has been ineffective because of the lack of U.S.’ calculation and considerations to the five variables.

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“…conflict, Iran had been able to neutralize or at least alleviate the U.S. pressures by aligning itself with some secondary powers including Russia, China and the European countries, at the final nuclear confrontation, all Iran's balancing acts failed and Iran was left alone before the international community's unified voice obliging Iran to cooperate . Kozhanov () writes in this regard: “By 2010, the EU, China, Japan, India, the UAE and South Korea were Iran's main trade partners; The fact that four of them supported the American sanctions of 2010 and even adopted their own punitive measures against Iran was considered by Washington to be an important diplomatic coup” (p. 149). In contrast to George Bush, Barack Obama adopted a multilateral approach to foreign policy and managed to build an international coalition against Iran's nuclear program.…”

Section: Asymmetric Hurting Stalemates Symmetric Enticing Opportunitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Iran and theUnitedStates: A Conflict Resolution Perspective

Soltaninejad

2015

Asian Politics and Policy

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The interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States (under Iran‐P5 + 1 umbrella) in November 2013 revived attention to the problem of the Iran‐U.S. conflict and its resolution. The key issues to understand are: first, the reasons for the start of nuclear dispute resolution between Iran and the United States despite failure of all the past reconciliation initiatives; and second, the agreement's implications for overall conflict resolution between the two countries. Relying on the “ripeness theory” and its development in response to criticisms, the central argument of the article is that the start of direct negotiations and efforts of Iran and the United States to reach agreement over the nuclear dispute is due to ripeness of the overall Iran‐U.S. conflict as a result of a nuclear “asymmetric hurting stalemate.” Explaining the factors that disrupt normalization of relations under conditions of ripeness, the article presents four scenarios for the future of Iran‐U.S. relations.

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U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Iran: Undermined by External Factors

Cited by 19 publications

References 2 publications

Iran as a ‘pariah’ nuclear aspirant

Iran as a ‘pariah’ nuclear aspirant

Post JCPOA

Iran and theUnitedStates: A Conflict Resolution Perspective

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