U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to Confusion

Recent Airpower Approaches to Counterinsurgency Operations

“…However, the interests of the airmen were focused on organizational independence from the U.S. Army, on the missions that best justified independence, i.e., strategic bombing (especially nuclear), and to a lesser extent deep interdiction, and for a time on the Korean conflict." 19 It does not suffice to have a force trained and equipped for a conventional conflict trying to learn on the fly without doctrinal and tactical guidance on how to apply airpower to support a different strategic problem set.…”

“…33 Additionally, Drew states, "The seriously mixed feelings about the denouement of the U.S. combat involvement in Vietnam, the unfortunate final outcome of the struggle in 1975, the desire to put the entire experience to rest, the perceived need to refocus on the Soviet threat, and a variety of other factors combined to limit debate and research about airpower in protracted revolutionary warfare." 34 Overall, the experience in Vietnam did not lead to the doctrinal adjustment that should have taken place in the event that the lessons learned would need to be applied in the future. The need to focus attention on the continued threat of a conventional or nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union is undeniable given the geopolitics of the time and the Army and USAF focused on AirLand battle as their primary mission.…”

Safety Precautions for Test Ranges

“…Today's airpower theorists still prefer to think of COIN "as little more than a small version of conventional war." 7 When combined with predictions that U.S. forces are more likely to be involved in such protracted conflicts in the future, the reluctance of U.S. military thinkers to address the peculiarities of COIN "creates an important void in U.S. airpower theory." 8 Similarly, COIN doctrine has largely minimized the utility of airpower.…”

“…In French Indochina, the Viet Minh employed tactics that "could obviate superior enemy airpower." 13 In the war's aftermath, the French lamented the challenges of "interdicting an enemy who required few supplies and relied on a very primitive and easily repairable logistic transportation system." 14 Confused and frustrated, the French questioned "the applicability of the central tenets of American airpower theory" to this form of warfare.…”

“…66 While employing airpower effectively is certainly challenging in some environments, to dismiss its effectiveness "is to overlook the inherent flexibility of the air vehicle." 67 Indeed, airpower has become a major asset in fighting insurgents. And today's global circumstances suggest the U.S. military will execute more COIN operations for the foreseeable future.…”