Typing for Conflict Detection in Access Control Policies

Adi, Kamel; Bouzida, Yacine; Hattak, Ikhlass; Logrippo, Luigi; Mankovskii, Serge

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-01187-0_17

Cited by 16 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…Although obvious instances of such conflicts are probably rare, hidden conflicts can arise by means of the mechanisms provided by the model. In [2], a typing system is presented to detect inconsistencies between permissions and prohibitions within security policies that are expressed using a CABAC formalism simpler than the one we present in this paper. Propositions for solving conflicts in access control policies were also presented in [3,[6][7][8]12].…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Concrete- and abstract-based access control

Bouzida

Logrippo

Mankovski

2011

Int. J. Inf. Secur.

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Access control models allow expressing access control rules (also called policies) stating that certain subjects (or users) have or do not have the right (or privilege) to access certain objects in order to execute certain actions under certain conditions. Several existing models allow expressing rules only for specific subjects, objects and actions. Rolebased access control (RBAC) introduced the notion of role, which is an abstraction over subjects. Organization-based access control (OrBAC) generalized further, by allowing specifying rules involving abstract subjects, abstract actions and abstract objects. We propose here a model that allows expressing rules involving any combinations of abstract or concrete subjects, actions and objects, as well as conditions over them. For this reason, our model is called concrete-and abstract-based access control model (CABAC). The semantics of our model is expressed in terms of first order predicate logic. Temporal, spatial, knowledge and historical contexts can be specified and combined. We show how in this model it is possible to express hierarchies of subjects, objects and actions as well as propagation of policies over hierarchies. Further, while in most models subjects, objects and actions, whether concrete or abstract, must be specified statically, it is possible in our model to specify subjects, actions and objects dynamically, i.e., according to conditions that can vary over time. Access control rules can also be explicitly revoked and Y. Bouzida · L. Logrippo (B) Université du Québec en Outaouais,

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These inconsistencies should be detected and then resolved. We have already discussed a method to detect similar anomalies using typing systems [2]. However, this method is limited to permissions and prohibitions.…”

Section: Emergency_record Salar Y_record} 2 )mentioning

confidence: 99%

Concrete- and abstract-based access control

Bouzida

Logrippo

Mankovski

2011

Int. J. Inf. Secur.

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“…Several works [29,1,22,12,11,8,20] have proposed techniques to detect inconsistencies and redundancies in XACML or extensions of RBAC policies by leveraging a variety of verification engines. None of these works provides decidability and complexity results of the analysis techniques as we do in this paper.…”

Section: Related Work and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Automated and Efficient Analysis of Role-Based Access Control with Attributes

Armando

Ranise²

2012

Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXVI

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“…Existing research work has mainly focused on the detection of inconsistencies in access control policies [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. However, less importance has been given to resolving the completeness problem.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Detecting incompleteness in access control policies using data classification schemes

Shaikh

Adi

Logrippo

et al. 2010

2010 Fifth International Conference on Digital Information Management (ICDIM)

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In a set of access control policies, incompleteness is the existence of situations for which no policy applies. Some of these situations can be exploited by attackers, to obtain unintended access or to compromise integrity. Such cases can be difficult to foresee, since typical policy sets consist of thousands of rules. In this paper, we adopt data classification techniques widely used in the machine learning community for detecting incompleteness in sets of access of control policies. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to use data classification algorithms to detect incompleteness in sets of access control policies. We show that our proposed solution is simple, efficient and practical.

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Typing for Conflict Detection in Access Control Policies

Cited by 16 publications

References 11 publications

Concrete- and abstract-based access control

Concrete- and abstract-based access control

Automated and Efficient Analysis of Role-Based Access Control with Attributes

Detecting incompleteness in access control policies using data classification schemes

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