Tycoon: An implementation of a distributed, market-based resource allocation system

Lai, Kevin; Rasmusson, Lars; Adar, Eytan; Zhang, Li; Huberman, Bernardo A.

doi:10.3233/mgs-2005-1303

Cited by 250 publications

(225 citation statements)

References 26 publications

(29 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

217

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Later, according to different metrics of either system or users in specified application scenarios, researchers have designed the improved commodity-market-based algorithms. Current market-oriented researches mainly fall into auction-based mechanism [9][10][11][12][13] and game-based mechanism [14][15][16][19] [20] two categories.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Global Benefit Maximization Task-Bundle Allocation

Zheng

et al. 2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Obtaining maximal benefit is usually the most important goal pursued by Grid resource/service provider. As providers and users being noncooperative inherently, it is a fundamental challenge to design a resource allocation strategy which seems to be fair. In order to adapt to large-scale Grid environment, we adopted a hierarchical grid structure with bundle tasks to describe the Grid system. A model called Intra-Site Cooperative-game of Taskbundle (ISCT) was proposed, in which all subordinate resources participated in making profits. We calculated task market price based on the theoretical proof that the system would gain maximal global benefit if and only if it was in a balanced state. Then we determined the task allocation solution with solving the task assignment amount vector. An Intra-Site Global Benefit Maximization Allocation for Task-bundle (ISGBMAT) was presented, which converted the Grid task-bundle allocation problem into an iteration process involving retail price, market price and assignment amount of tasks. Extensive simulation experiments with real workload traces were conducted to verify our algorithm. The experimental results indicated that ISGBMAT could provide an effective solution with global benefit and completion time optimization and also adapt to dynamic Grid market.

show abstract

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Global Benefit Maximization Task-Bundle Allocation

Zheng

et al. 2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Spawn [6] managed heterogeneous computer resources based on Vickery auction, so did CORE [7]. Double auctions were used in JaWS [8] and preferred by many projects such as Tycoon [9]. However, these projects only adopted the basic auction methods instead of researching them deeply.…”

Section: ⋆⋆ Email Address: Dding@bjtueducnmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Greedy Double Auction Mechanism for Grid Resource Allocation

Ding

Luo

Gao

2010

Job Scheduling Strategies for Parallel Processing

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. To improve the resource utilization and satisfy more users, a Greedy Double Auction Mechanism(GDAM) is proposed to allocate resources in grid environments. GDAM trades resources at discriminatory price instead of uniform price, reflecting the variance in requirements for profits and quantities. Moreover, GDAM applies different auction rules to different cases, over-demand, over-supply and equilibrium of demand and supply. As a new mechanism for grid resource allocation, GDAM is proved to be strategy-proof, economically efficient, weakly budgetbalanced and individual rational. Simulation results also confirm that GDAM outperforms the traditional one on both the total trade amount and the user satisfaction percentage, specially as more users are involved in the auction market.

show abstract

“…Vickrey, English, Dutch, and double auctions [12] as well as combinatorial mechanisms [4,24,25]. Prominent examples of market mechanisms for scheduling of computational resources like CPU and Memory are based on proportional share mechanisms [15], where the users receive a share of the computer resource proportional to their valuations fraction of the overall valuation across all users. A related and implemented mechanism is the so-called pay-as-bid mechanism proposed in [23,26], where the user pays the price he has bid.…”

Section: Prototypical Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

SORMA – Business Cases for an Open Grid Market: Concept and Implementation

Nimis

Anandasivam

Borissov

et al. 2008

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Economic mechanisms enhance technological solutions by setting the right incentives to reveal information about demand and supply accurately. Market or pricing mechanisms are ones that foster information exchange and can therefore attain efficient allocation. By assigning a value (also called utility) to their service requests, users can reveal their relative urgency or costs to the service. The implementation of theoretical sound models induce further complex challenges. The EU-funded project SORMA analyzes these challenges and provides a prototype as a proof-of-concept. In this paper the approach within the SORMA-project is described on both conceptual and technical level.

show abstract

Tycoon: An implementation of a distributed, market-based resource allocation system

Cited by 250 publications

References 26 publications

A Global Benefit Maximization Task-Bundle Allocation

A Global Benefit Maximization Task-Bundle Allocation

A Greedy Double Auction Mechanism for Grid Resource Allocation

SORMA – Business Cases for an Open Grid Market: Concept and Implementation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About