Two Ways to Particularize a Property

Abstract

Trope theory is an increasingly prominent contender in contemporary debates about the existence and nature of properties. But it suffers from ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation reveals two fundamentally different concepts of a trope: modifier tropes and module tropes. These types of tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work. Modifier tropes have advantages concerning powers, relations, and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes have advantages concerning perception, causation, character-grounding, and the ontology of substance. Thus, the choice between modifier tropes and module tropes is significant and divides the advantages of trope theory simpliciter. In addition, each resulting trope theory is unstable: modifier trope theory threatens to collapse into realism, and module trope theory threatens to collapse into austere nominalism. This invites reflection on the stability of trope theory in general.

Powerful Substances Because of Powerless Powers

“…While Garcia focuses exclusively on tropes, I extend this to other candidates for properties as well, such as the property instances of universals. See Garcia 2015; 2016. )…”

“…O is spherical in virtue of a spherical property S (either a property instance or trope). If S is a non-self-exemplifying property, then O is spherical because of S but S itself is not spherical (Garcia 2015: 637). In this case, S confers a character on O but S does not confer its own character on O .…”

“…The second reason to hold that powers are non-self-exemplifying properties stems from higher-level powers grounded in lower-level properties. Take a ball's power to roll down an inclined plane (Lowe 2010: 19; Garcia 2015: 639–40). The ball's power to roll—a dispositional property—is grounded in other properties: the ball's sphericity, mass, and rigidness.…”

“…So the sphericity, mass, and rigidness do not have the power to roll. Instead, they dispose something else—a distinct bearer—to have that power (Garcia 2015: 639–40). With respect to the power to roll, they are non-self-disposing properties.…”

What is a fourdimensionalist to do about temporally extended properties?

“…Finally, it is worth considering whether a temporally sensitive treatment of TEPs stands a better chance within the trope theorist's framework. This will certainly depend on the type of trope theory one has in mind (whether it is a two category substance–attribute account or one category bundle of tropes account), as well as the particular conception of tropes that is invoked (whether they are conceived as what Garcia () has called “modifier” tropes or “module” tropes).…”