Two Sides of 'Silencing'

Seidman, Jeffrey

doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00385.x

Cited by 18 publications

(12 citation statements)

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“…Judgments about the right to an act requires greater attention to a person's roles and prerogatives in relation to moral judgments. Thus, such judgments of whether one would have a right to engage in an action are an indicator of the extent to which moral judgments are viewed as binding on one's actions [Seldman, 2005]. In general and across types of actions, the U-shaped age-related pattern in which 11-to 14-year-olds differed from younger and older participants was more pronounced in the case of evaluations of a right to engage in the action than was observed in their judgments of right and wrong.…”

Section: Continuities and Discontinuities In Judgments Of A Right To Actmentioning

confidence: 99%

Continuities and Discontinuities in the Development of Moral Judgments

2017

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Prior research has outlined developmental changes within the conventional and personal domains. Research thus far has provided only limited understanding of age-related changes within the moral domain. That research indicates that there are continuities and discontinuities across ages in moral judgments. The aims of the research presented here were to examine moral judgments in childhood and adolescence, taking into account applications of moral judgments in contexts and the coordination of different considerations in evaluations and decisions. Participants were 167 children and adolescents drawn from two regions of the United States, from diverse ethnic and SES backgrounds, distributed across four age groups from 8 to 17 years. Moral judgments were assessed through interviews around issues of direct harm (hitting), indirect harm (returning dropped money), and helping. Each situation was presented within three conditions: unconflicted situations; situations of conflict with needs of self; and conflicts with needs of another. Situations varied in terms of characteristics of the person who was the object of moral decisions: a generic other, vulnerable other, or antagonistic other. Participants made two types of judgments: whether the action was right or wrong; and whether the actor would have a right to engage in the action if that was the actor's choice. Justifications were elicited for judgments. Cross-age continuities in moral judgments were observed in judgments of acts as wrong in the unconflicted contexts. In contrast, a U-shaped age-related pattern was revealed in judgments of acts as well as the right to engage in acts in the conflicted situations with 8- and 16-year-olds judging acts as wrong and 10- to 14-year-olds more likely to judge acts as right and the actor as having a right to engage in the action. This U-shaped pattern was accompanied by three age-related levels in the coordination of moral and nonmoral elements of situations.

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Section: Continuities and Discontinuities In Judgments Of A Right To Actmentioning

confidence: 99%

Continuities and Discontinuities in the Development of Moral Judgments

2017

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“…For example, in a given situation, the moral reasons for acting a certain way might be strong enough to override the prudential reasons against, but since they do not also silence those reasons, the action is imprudent but morally required. Because of this, it might also be appropriately described 21 On silencing, see McDowell (1998: 17), Scanlon (1998: 51), Seidman (2005), and Tanyi (2013: 890). 22 The silencing interpretation is suggested by Backhouse (2016: 226), who writes, ".…”

Section: Two Kinds Of Suspensionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Teleological Suspensions In Fear and Trembling

McDaniel

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…Of course, an agent's reasons and her motivating desires can come apart, and everyone needs an account of what such states involve. 12 But we can 8 For a discussion of how virtue, generally, involves the situational silencing of desire, see McDowell (1998) and Seidman (2004). 9 A single state of affairs can be desired under different descriptions, and I know of no argument that shows that when I finally desire some outcome, I must finally desire it under every possible description.…”

Section: The Subjectivist's Best Response: a Metaethically Neutral Acmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to be impartial as a subjectivist

Atiq

2015

Philos Stud

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The metaethical subjectivist claims that there is nothing more to a moral disagreement than a conflict in the desires of the parties involved. Recently, David Enoch has argued that metaethical subjectivism has unacceptable ethical implications. If the subjectivist is right about moral disagreement, then it follows, according to Enoch, that we cannot stand our ground in moral disagreements without violating the demands of impartiality. For being impartial, we're told, involves being willing to compromise in conflicts that are merely due to competing desires-the parties to such conflicts should decide what to do on the basis of a coin flip. I suggest that Enoch is mistaken in his conception of what it means to be impartial. Once impartiality is properly construed, standing one's ground in desire-based conflicts, whether or not moral values are at stake in the conflict, is consistent with being impartial. I defend a view on which impartiality can be understood in terms of features of our desiring attitudes. An agent acts impartially in desire-based conflicts whenever she is motivated by a final (i.e. non-instrumental) desire that aims at promoting the wellbeing of persons in a way that is insensitive to the identities of persons and their morally arbitrary features like their gender or skin color. Based on the account, I explain where Enoch's discussion of the argument goes wrong, as well as why responses to the argument from Enoch's critics have so far missed the mark.

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Two Sides of 'Silencing'

Cited by 18 publications

References 1 publication

Continuities and Discontinuities in the Development of Moral Judgments

Continuities and Discontinuities in the Development of Moral Judgments

Teleological Suspensions In Fear and Trembling

How to be impartial as a subjectivist

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