Two sides of economic openness: non-tariff barriers to trade and capital controls in transition countries, 1993–2000

Abstract

This article presents new measures of foreign economic openness in the transition countries that allow us to distinguish between non-tariff barriers to trade and capital controls. We argue that this distinction is important for the analysis of foreign economic relations in the postcommunist world. While most states lowered barriers to trade since 1993, they increased the number of capital controls, which had been low at the beginning of the transition process. The ELITE (Economic Liberalization in the Transition Economies) data set, which is based on the IMF statistics on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions and encompasses 24 transition countries, further demonstrates important exceptions to this trend. The comparison of the ELITE indicators with alternative measurements of economic openness indicates the need to move towards more refined analyses of the political economy of the transition process.

Capitalist junctures: Explaining economic openness in the transition countries

“…The Elite database yields a rather mixed picture of the reform record of the transition countries (Bodenstein et al. 2003).…”

“…Poland removed some of its non‐tariff barriers to trade between 1993 and 2000, but left its capital controls at a relatively high level. Russia became more protectionist on both dimensions of foreign economic policy making in the second half of the 1990s (Bodenstein et al. 2003).…”

“…The transition mode argument receives ample support in our multivariate analysis in which we rely on the Economic Liberalization in the Transitions Economies (ELITE) data set (Bodenstein et al. 2003).…”

“…The transition mode argument receives ample support in our multivariate analysis in which we rely on the Economic Liberalization in the Transitions Economies (ELITE) data set (Bodenstein et al 2003). In contrast to extant measures of foreign economic openness, the ELITE variables capture the degree of actual regulation rather than real trade flows.…”

Frieden und Globalisierung

“…Ferner sollten wir zwischen dem regulativen Input und dem ökonomischen Output der Globalisierung unterscheiden. So lässt sich etwa mit Daten des Internationalen Währungsfonds erfassen, wie dereguliert der Freihandel und der Kapitalverkehr in einem Land rein juristisch ist (Bodenstein/Plümper/Schneider 2002;Martin/Schneider 2007). Der ökonomische Output bezieht sich auf die Importe bzw.…”