Two puzzles for shared-reason accounts of persuasion

Whitfield, Gregory

doi:10.1080/2158379x.2021.1901198

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…This means that i can appeal to suitable reasons even in cases where i does not meet the supplementary conditions for reason E to be decisive in her own case. This gives us a different condition for when conjectural reasons are manipulative compared with Whitfield (2021). The decisive factor is not whether i is covert or open about being opposed to drinking alcohol.…”

Section: Conditions For Non-manipulation: Communicative Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

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Manipulation in politics and public policy

Dowding,

Oprea

2024

Economics and Philosophy

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Many philosophical accounts of manipulation are blind to the extent to which actual people fall short of the rational ideal, while prominent accounts in political science are under-inclusive. We offer necessary and sufficient conditions – Suitable Reason and Testimonial Honesty – distinguishing manipulative from non-manipulative influence; develop a ‘hypothetical disclosure test’ to measure the degree of manipulation; and provide further criteria to assess and compare the morality of manipulation across cases. We discuss multiple examples drawn from politics and from public policy with particular attention to recent debates about the ethics and politics of nudge.

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Section: Conditions For Non-manipulation: Communicative Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The revised SR condition responds to Whitfield's (2021) concern about 'conjectural reasons'. Reasons can be suitable even if they are not decisive in the particular case.…”

Section: Conditions For Non-manipulation: Communicative Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

Manipulation in politics and public policy

Dowding,

Oprea

2024

Economics and Philosophy

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Individually lucky, collectively powerful: a response to friends

Dowding

2021

Journal of Political Power

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A More Liberal Public Reason Liberalism

Fumagalli

2022

Moral Philosophy and Politics

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In recent years, leading public reason liberals have argued that publicly justifying coercive laws and policies requires that citizens offer both adequate secular justificatory reasons and adequate secular motivating reasons for these laws and policies. In this paper, I provide a critical assessment of these two requirements and argue for two main claims concerning such requirements. First, only some qualified versions of the requirement that citizens offer adequate secular justificatory reasons for coercive laws and policies may be justifiably regarded as plausible liberal principles of public justification. And second, the requirement that citizens offer adequate secular motivating reasons for coercive laws and policies is untenable on multiple grounds. Public reason liberals should focus on assessing the justificatory reasons offered for and against coercive laws and policies rather than requiring citizens to offer adequate secular motivating reasons for such laws and policies.

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Two puzzles for shared-reason accounts of persuasion

Cited by 3 publications

References 23 publications

Manipulation in politics and public policy

Manipulation in politics and public policy

Individually lucky, collectively powerful: a response to friends

A More Liberal Public Reason Liberalism

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