Two-party Contests and the Politics of Electoral Reforms: The Case of Taiwan

Abstract

This article examines how party competition has led to electoral reforms in Taiwan. Dissatisfied with the existing system, political parties in Taiwan promoted electoral reforms. The Democratic Progressive Party led the reform process and the Kuomintang collaborated with it to change the electoral system from a single non-transferable vote and multi-member district system to a first-past-the-post mixed system. Despite opposition to the changes, these two parties successfully formed a coalition and passed reform bills with the support of the public. Using a theoretical framework of actors’ rational choices, this article argues that the parties’ goals of maximizing the number of seats and strategic interaction led to electoral reforms, and that during the reforms, the provision that the first-past-the-post system would provide more seats in the Legislative Yuan was crucial for the two parties. The article supports this argument with evidence from interviews, biographies and documents.

Contentious Institutionalization of Protests under Democracy: The Evidence from Taiwan, 1986–2016

“…The two parties also differ in terms of other social issues and political values. The KMT is more conservative when it comes to human rights, environmental protection and gender equality, whereas as the heir of the opposition movement, the DPP appears more liberal (Buchanan and Nicholls 2003;Chi 2014;Huang and Sheng 2022). We hypothesize that the ruling party's orientation will affect the generation of protests (Hypothesis 2a).…”

Party leadership, electoral reform, and mandate-divide

“…barrel projects to appeal the support of particular constituents (Cox, 1990;Myerson, 1993;Cox and Thies, 1998;Stockton, 2010;Chi, 2014).…”

“…Thus, legislators are more likely to defect from the party because they still have the chance to be elected even if running as an independent or representing another party label under MMD. Due to a lower electoral threshold under MMD, candidates are incentivized to articulate radical language, take extreme policy stances, use vote-buying strategies, and target specific groups of constituents with particularistic proposals and pork-barrel projects to appeal the support of particular constituents (Cox, 1990; Myerson, 1993; Cox and Thies, 1998; Stockton, 2010; Chi, 2014).…”

“…Yu-Ceng Liao barrel projects to appeal the support of particular constituents (Cox, 1990;Myerson, 1993;Cox and Thies, 1998;Stockton, 2010;Chi, 2014). The electoral reform changed the relations between candidates and parties.…”

Democratic consolidation in Taiwan in comparative perspective

“…Both parties also dominate legislative elections to the Yuan, although less decisively because of the electoral system which has undergone a series of significant changes since 2008. These changes have provided a stronger electoral incentive for smaller parties to compete (Chi, 2014; Fell, 2005; Patterson and Stockton, 2010). 2 The relative stability of the party system in Taiwan stands in contrast to other consolidated or partly consolidated democracies within the region, particularly South Korea which has been marked by electoral volatility and party fluidity punctuated by periods of military rule (Hermanns, 2009).…”