Two Notions of Shame

Abstract

On most accounts present in the literature, the complex experience of shame has the injury to self-esteem as its main component. A rival view, originally propounded by St Augustine, relates shame to the structure of human agency, and more specifically, to the conflict between will and desire. A recent version of this view developed by David Velleman relates shame to the capacity of self-presentation and the need for privacy. I examine two different interpretations of Velleman's theory and argue that neither suggests a credible alternative to the received view. Hobbesian theories of shameAssume that a person has a certain idea of his own self. He has formed certain beliefs about his physical capacities, his intellectual capacities, his standing in the society, his achievements, his relationships with his friends and family members. Then we say that he is in possession of a self-assessment theory providing him with a scale for grading his various qualities, relations, and activities. Each of these grades is accompanied by value ascriptions: the person should have formed beliefs about how much value each of the properties he attributes to himself is supposed to carry. There would be occasions when at least one of these values decreases. On such occasions the person would become aware that his capacities or achievements are not as significant as he thought they were. Given that those capacities and achievements carry at least some value in the agent's eyes, his overall self-esteem would decrease. The emotional reaction to this decrease in value is shame. The decrease itself can come from a number of sources. It can be a result of the agent's own action, of an action directed at him, or even of someone else's action directed at some third party.Shame is a result of a procedure of self-evaluation in which the agent is engaged in appraising his own worth. Where, as a result of that appraisal, the agent's opinion of his worth -what we call his

A Hobbesian Theory of Shame

“…33 For a powerful statement see Merrell Lynd (1971) and, more recently, Velleman (2006). I discuss the role of privacy in shame in Berkovski (2014). revealed, a quality which the individual would wish to keep hidden from others. His shrinking public esteem would then lead to a corresponding damage of self-esteem.…”

“…41 See Williams (1993:75-87). 42 I discuss it in Berkovski (2014). there can be a clean separation between 'culture' and 'civility'. 43 As this large subject falls outside the scope of our discussion, let me repeat that Hobbesian shame, in any of its variants, would necessarily qualify as 'moral shame'.…”

“… For a powerful statement see Merrell Lynd () and, more recently, Velleman (). I discuss the role of privacy in shame in Berkovski ().…”