1975
DOI: 10.1016/s0022-5371(75)80064-8
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Two models of syllogistic reasoning: Feature selection and conversion

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Cited by 124 publications
(47 citation statements)
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“…Our data fail to substantiate the thesis that reasoners as a matter of course convert all premises or are universally subject to "atmosphere" effects (see Revlis, 1975).…”
Section: Discussioncontrasting
confidence: 95%
“…Our data fail to substantiate the thesis that reasoners as a matter of course convert all premises or are universally subject to "atmosphere" effects (see Revlis, 1975).…”
Section: Discussioncontrasting
confidence: 95%
“…Because the effect is stronger for valid conclusions, Woodworth and Sells (1935) argued for an independent inferential mechanism. Revlis (1975) developed the atmosphere hypothesis into a model in which errors can occur in working out the joint atmosphere of the two premises. The model postulates that participants will reject a putative conclusion if it does not fit the atmosphere of the premises.…”
Section: Heuristic Theories Of Syllogistic Reasoningmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Early psychological studies of syllogisms were concerned with the factors that lead reasoners astray, the atmosphere of the premises (e.g., Woodworth & Sells, 1935), the illicit conversion of premises (e.g., Chapman & Chapman, 1959), and the adverse effects of beliefs and prejudices (e.g., Henle & Michael, 1956). Twenty years ago, however, psychologists proposed the first theories of how reasoners might reach valid conclusions (e.g., Erickson, 1974;Johnson-Laird, 1975;Revlis, 1975). Since then, there has been a plethora of theories, some based on Euler circles (Fisher, 1981;Ford, 1995;Stenning & Oberlander, 1995); some based on Venn diagrams (Guyote & Sternberg, 1981;Newell, 1981); some based on mental models (Cardaci, Gangemi, Pendolino, & Di Nuovo, 1996;Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984;Polk & Newell, 1995); some based on formal rules of inference (Braine & Rumain, 1983;Rips, 1994); and some based on the idea that individuals are not reasoning, but are following the atmosphere of the premises (Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990;Martin Levine, personal communication, 1994) or selecting a conclusion that matches the mood of the least informative premise (Chater & Oaksford, 1999).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%