2016
DOI: 10.1007/s10586-016-0557-x
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Two game-based solution concepts for a two-agent scheduling problem

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Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
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References 26 publications
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“…Cole et al 14 presented simple mechanisms that required only local information and used the game theoretic insights to obtain a new combinatorial approximation algorithm for the underlying optimization problem. Zhao et al 15 considered a two-agent scheduling problem on a single machine. They designed a Pareto-efficient solution set and used the Shapley value method to evaluate the job sequence of two agents by comparing the net profit and opportunity.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cole et al 14 presented simple mechanisms that required only local information and used the game theoretic insights to obtain a new combinatorial approximation algorithm for the underlying optimization problem. Zhao et al 15 considered a two-agent scheduling problem on a single machine. They designed a Pareto-efficient solution set and used the Shapley value method to evaluate the job sequence of two agents by comparing the net profit and opportunity.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Authors use the game-theoretic insights to obtain a new combinatorial approximation algorithm for the underlying optimization problem. Zhao et al 15 state two agents scheduling problem on single machine. They design the pareto efficient solution set and the Shapley value method and evaluate two agents' job sequence by comparing net profit and opportunity.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the success of cooperation cannot only depend on mutual trust and recommendation. Benefits and selfinterests could change the decision and outcome [9,10]. Due to autonomous attribute, the referral will judge gains and losses before promising to cooperate.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…. , )(8) // Launch cooperation(9) Calculate interaction result and income results (0, op), ( − , ), (− , ) (10) end for (11) end for (12) Calculate executing cooperation revenues Algorithm 1: TR-DII. Moving state of agents in grids (solid color grid is initial position; plaid grid is terminal position).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%