Two eyewitnesses are more persuasive than one except when they remember a suspect's feature.

Slane, Crystal R.; Dodson, Chad S.

doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2018.12.002

Cited by 11 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 23 publications

(46 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In Experiments 1 and 2, participants rated the identical confidence statements about a lineup identification as meaning a lower level of certainty when they referenced a facial feature (e.g., “I am very confident. I remember his eyes”), as compared to when the statement was presented alone (e.g., “I am very confident”), replicating past research on the featural justification effect (e.g., Dobolyi & Dodson, 2018; Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015; Slane & Dodson, 2019). Participants’ perceptions of the witness’s certainty were affected by their impressions of the witness’s accuracy (Cash & Lane, 2017; Dodson & Dobolyi, 2017).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 77%

Improving the interpretation of verbal eyewitness confidence statements by distinguishing perceptions of certainty from those of accuracy.

Grabman¹,

Cash²,

Slane³

et al. 2022

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When an eyewitness makes an identification from a lineup, police are also instructed to collect a verbal expression of confidence. This recommendation hinges on the assumption that evaluators will perceive confidence in the manner the witness intended. However, research has consistently shown that these interpretations can be biased by accompanying contextual information. For example, statements that reference facial features (e.g., “I’m very sure. I remember his eyes.”) are perceived as less confident than when the statement is presented alone (“I’m very sure.”) (featural justification effect). Additionally, perceptions of witness confidence are altered when the witness’s identification (mis-)matches the police suspect in a lineup (prior knowledge). We find that the same underlying mechanism explains the bias induced by both featural justification (Experiments 1 and 2) and prior knowledge (Experiment 3) manipulations. Evaluators conflate their own beliefs about the accuracy of an identification with the witness’s intended level of confidence. A simple warning that highlights the differences between confidence and accuracy eliminates the featural justification effect, but is less effective for mitigating the influence of prior knowledge. The key takeaway from this paper is that distinguishing perceptions of certainty from those of accuracy improves the interpretation of verbal confidence statements.

show abstract

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 77%

Improving the interpretation of verbal eyewitness confidence statements by distinguishing perceptions of certainty from those of accuracy.

Grabman¹,

Cash²,

Slane³

et al. 2022

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Criminal cases involving eyewitness testimony commonly include multiple eyewitnesses (e.g., Tollestrup et al, 1994; Wright & McDaid, 1996; Yuille & Tollestrup, 1992), yet few studies have examined the influence of single versus multiple eyewitnesses on juror decision making. One study told mock jurors that either one or two highly confident eyewitnesses had identified a suspect (Slane & Dodson, 2019). Each eyewitness provided a confidence statement with a featural justification, a general recognition justification, or no justification.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Eyewitness confidence and mock juror decisions of guilt: A meta-analytic review.

Slane¹,

Dodson²

2022

Law and Human Behavior

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Objective: We investigated the impact of eyewitness confidence on the following dependent variables: (a) guilty or not-guilty verdict; (b) judgments of guilt as measured on a scale; and (c) mock jurors' perception of the accuracy of an eyewitness's identification. In addition, we examined two potential moderators of the effects of eyewitness confidence: (a) whether the eyewitness expressed confidence at trial versus during the initial lineup identification and (b) whether the eyewitness provided a numerical versus a verbal statement of confidence. Hypotheses: We expected all analyses to reveal that highly confident eyewitnesses are more persuasive to mock jurors than are eyewitnesses with lower confidence (Hypothesis 1). We expected eyewitness confidence at trial (relative to at identification) to be more persuasive to mock jurors (Hypothesis 2). We expected numerical expressions of confidence to be more persuasive to mock jurors than verbal confidence expressions (Hypothesis 3). Method: We conducted a meta-analysis of 35 studies from 20 published papers and seven theses or dissertations to quantify the effect of eyewitness confidence on juror judgments and investigated the influence of two primary moderator variables, time of confidence and format of confidence expression. Results: All analyses revealed an effect of eyewitness confidence on mock juror decisions (gs = .21-.36). Our moderator analysis showed that the timing of the confidence statement (identification vs. trial) did not affect the influence of eyewitness confidence on mock jurors' judgments of guilt or accuracy. The influence of eyewitness confidence was not moderated by verbal versus numerical expressions of confidence. Conclusions: Although eyewitness confidence is persuasive to mock jurors, the size of this effect is modest. Moreover, verbal and numerical expressions of confidence have similar persuasive effects, and mock jurors do not appear to be sensitive to the likely difference in evidentiary strength of eyewitness confidence expressed at the initial identification versus at trial. Public Significance StatementHighly confident eyewitnesses are persuasive to jurors, but eyewitness misidentification is a leading cause of wrongful imprisonment. Although confidence at the time of an initial identification from a lineup can be predictive of eyewitnesses' accuracy, confidence at trial is typically not. Our findings suggest that mock jurors are not sensitive to this distinction and that they weigh eyewitness confidence at trial as strongly as they weigh confidence at the time of the identification. Understanding how jurors weigh eyewitness confidence from these two time points can promote new ways of instructing jurors to properly assess eyewitness testimony.

show abstract

“…This phenomenon occurs when perceptions of eyewitness confidence and accuracy decrease when a witness references a nondistinctive, physical feature of the suspect as a justification for their identification (e.g., “I am certain. I would never forget his nose” see Cash & Lane, 2017, 2021; Dodson & Dobolyi, 2015, 2017; Grabman & Dodson, 2019; Slane & Dodson, 2019). Despite this being an eyewitness scenario, the overarching theme is that additional information perceived as “unwarranted” detracts from the credibility of something that is being assessed.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

TMI? Accompanying details impact statements’ perceived veracity.

Cash

Trinka

Hernandez

et al. 2022

Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science / Revue canadienne des

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Deception is a ubiquitous part of human interaction. However, discriminating between truthful and deceptive statements is an arduous task. Research has shown that truthful and deceptive accounts vary the type of content provided, suggesting that verbal cues are a diagnostic approach when discerning statement veracity. The present studies examine participants' expectations regarding what content is believed to be present in both truthful and deceptive statements. Specifically, we examined how different types of accompanying information impact statement believability. Participants read statements that varied in the content that was presented and indicated whether they believed the statement to be truthful or deceptive. Additionally, we manipulated consequence severity. Some participants were told that the statement provider had a high incentive to lie while others were told that there was a low incentive. Across both experiments, we observed that certain types of additional information decreased statement believability. Specifically, statements that included a personal qualification or an excuse were more likely to be perceived as being deceptive than statements that did not contain additional details or contained details specific to the task. This finding was true regardless of consequence severity. These findings suggest that not all accompanying details increase credibility and are discussed through the lens of Gricean maxims as well as other theories of deception detection. Public Significance StatementResearch has shown that people perform poorly when distinguishing truthful from deceptive statements. The present studies explore how additional accompanying information may make a statement appear more or less believable. The results from these studies found that statements that included details about the speakers' personal character or an excuse were more likely to be judged as deceptive compared to statements that had minimal information or details specific to the task. Information about the situational factors did not seem to impact these judgments.

show abstract

Two eyewitnesses are more persuasive than one except when they remember a suspect's feature.

Cited by 11 publications

References 23 publications

Improving the interpretation of verbal eyewitness confidence statements by distinguishing perceptions of certainty from those of accuracy.

Improving the interpretation of verbal eyewitness confidence statements by distinguishing perceptions of certainty from those of accuracy.

Eyewitness confidence and mock juror decisions of guilt: A meta-analytic review.

TMI? Accompanying details impact statements’ perceived veracity.

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About