Two cultures and tragedy of the commons

Lovett, Jon C.; Quinn, Claire H.; Ockwell, David; Gregorowski, R.

doi:10.1111/j.1365-2028.2006.00621.x

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Questions include how these technologies affect the dynamics of resource management and collective action potential and whether key issues highlighted in the analysis above, such as seasonality and fair allocation, persist regardless of the effective property rights regime implied by different technological applications. This also speaks to broader debates in the CPR literature that engage with tensions between moves towards privatizing CPRs vs. collective action based solutions and whether or not poor and marginalised women and men gain or lose as a result [71].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Rethinking the sustainability and institutional governance of electricity access and mini-grids: Electricity as a common pool resource

Gollwitzer

Ockwell

Muok

et al. 2018

Energy Research & Social Science

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Rethinking the sustainability and institutional governance of electricity access and mini-grids: Electricity as a common pool resource

Gollwitzer

Ockwell

Muok

et al. 2018

Energy Research & Social Science

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“…Moreover, most of the biodiversity in developing nation (DN) reside in the commons, especially under systems of low intensity management (Lovett et al 2006). Commons are means of livelihood for many rural people and rural poverty alleviation in DN requires its sustainable management.…”

Section: Collective Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict in commons: collective action and institutions

Sarkar

2021

Sust. Agric. Food Env. Res.

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Common pool resources (CPRs) are safe-guards and foundation for rural livelihood especially for the developing nations like India. Cooperation is needed to conserve CPRs due to its very features. Community institutions sometimes face conflicts to conserve commons cost-effectively. But, conflicts may simultaneously help and hamper the local governance of commons. For empirical verification, we have conducted a primary survey on 419 users of canal water, community forest and tank water in 11 CPRs dependent villages from West Bengal, India. We observed positive relations between conflict and collective action in conservation of commons. This finding seems to be conflicting with the notion that, conflict undermines collective action and therewith the potential for sustainability. We examined and found that successful informal communities are more conflictive and at the same time cooperative than formal one. The occurrences of supply, demand and policy side conflicts and conflict resolution methods are also not significantly different between formal and informal institutions. Therefore, conflict and informal institution have some positive impact for the successful conservation. We suggest that authorities have to study the nature and types of conflicts before implementing rules and institutional arrangements thereafter. Keywords – collective action, institutions, commons, conflicts, conservation

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“…Studying institutions that govern CPR management in SSA is important, as CPRs are vital assets for the rural poor. Moreover, most of the biodiversity in SSA resides in the CPRs, especially under systems of low intensity management (Lovett et al 2006). Among other CPRs, forests and grazing lands are means of livelihoods for many rural households (Benin et al 2003;Bedru 2007;Frost et al 2007;Appiah et al 2009) and rural poverty reduction in SSA requires the sustainable management of these CPRs (Clover 2003;Girmay 2006).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%