Two challenges to the embodied version of the autopoietic theory

Abstract

“In Are living beings extended autopoietic systems? An embodied reply”, Villalobos and Razeto-Barry offer an articulation of the embodied aspect of the autopoietic theory. Their aim is to block the extended interpretation of this theory. For them, living beings are, simply put, autopoietic bodies. In this commentary, I advance two concerns regarding the alleged cases of extended living beings. On the one hand, I argue that their proposal fails to account for the intuitive difference between these cases and living beings that are embedded in the environment. On the other hand, I argue that, from the perspective offered by the authors, there also seems to be a problem in the way the boundaries of a system are delineated.

Living beings as autopoietic bodies

“…No, but since EAT’s formula is not meant to be a definition, we should not expect from it a recipe to answer that kind of question. Borderline cases, fuzzy boundaries, and the ambiguities that arise from them (which worry Clavel, 2019; Di Paolo, 2019; McGregor, 2019; Miller & Nave, 2019; Stapleton, 2019) are problems for definitions, not for theoretical identity scientific statements.…”

“…EAT does not provide a neat definition of living beings, and is so open to borderline cases and ambiguities (Clavel, 2019; Di Paolo, 2019; McGregor, 2019; Miller & Nave, 2019; Stapleton, 2019).…”