Twisting arms and sending messages

Abstract

We examine the strategic rationale for terrorist tactics in civil war. We identify conditions that favor terrorism as a tactic in armed civil conflicts as well as the specific targets as a function of rebel characteristics, goals, and government responses to political demands. Terrorist tactics can be helpful as an instrument to coerce the government in asymmetric conflicts, as rebels are typically weak relative to the government. But terrorism can also help communicate the goals and resolve of a group when there is widespread uncertainty. We consider the strategic importance and rationale for terrorism in terms of the frequency of attacks and specific targets, and analyze our propositions using new data linking actors from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Data and the Global Terrorism Database. Consistent with our expectations, we find that terrorism is used more extensively in civil conflicts by weaker groups and when attacks can help the group convey its goals without undermining popular support. Groups with more inclusive audiences are more likely to focus on 'hard' or official targets, while groups with more sectarian audiences are more likely to attack 'soft' targets and civilians.

Recruiting Rebels: Introducing the Rebel Appeals and Incentives Dataset

“…Using existing data (e.g., Cohen 2013Cohen , 2016, I include a binary indicator of whether a group employs forced recruitment tactics, as groups that rely more on material incentives often turn to forced recruitment (Weinstein 2007) and groups that use forced recruitment are more likely to perpetrate rape (Cohen 2013). Using data from Polo and Gleditsch (2016), I control for whether a group has a left-wing ideology, as such organizations are less likely to engage in wartime rape (Hoover Green 2016) and have the social capital to recruit with ideological appeals.…”

Your space or mine? Competition, control, and the spatial profile of militant violence against civilians

“…Many also view civilian targeting as a weapon of the weak (e.g. Hultman, 2007; Polo & Gleditsch, 2016). As Asal et al (2019: 4) explain, ‘weak organisations’ coercive measures seek to deter civilians from collaborating with the government, and the relationship is found to be stronger as the government uses more violence’.…”

“…While providing substantial insights, quantitative research largely treats civilian targeting as a static feature of conflict systems at either the country or group level (e.g. Kalyvas, 2006; Weinstein, 2006; Polo & Gleditsch, 2016). This offers little explanation for variation in the patterns of violence across time and space.…”

Variations in War Crimes During the Sierra Leone Civil War

“…Such violence may be an attempt at general or specific deterrence on certain civilian behaviors or retaliation for defying the rebel's wishes (Asal et al, 2019;Kalyvas, 2006;Stanton, 2013). It can serve as a force multiplier and can be a rational response to an asymmetrical environment by compensating for military weakness or the rising costs of conflict (Crenshaw, 1981;Downes, 2006;Pape, 2003;Polo & Gleditsch, 2016;Stanton, 2013). It can be the product of groups competing for public support (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008) or over economic resources (R. Wood & Kathman, 2012).…”