Turnout, Political Preferences and Information: Experimental Evidence from Perú

León, Gianmarco

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1965669

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 76 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In addition to showing that political parties are sensitive to these considerations, we also find that the interaction with structural features determining the ability of parties to implement turnout buying may be just as important. In this respect our findings dovetail with previous research showing that institutions like the secret ballot (Cox and Kousser 1981; Nichter 2008), compulsory voting (León 2013), and party machines (Rakove 1976; Stokes et al 2013) affect election day strategies.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 90%

“…Empirically, our results extend the existing literature in several ways. First, unlike previous studies examining the effects of institutions on vote buying (Cox and Kousser 1981; León 2013), we instead explain variation in turnout buying and exploit a powerful research design to identify causal effects consistent with our monitoring explanation. Second, we identify the conditions under which parties interact effectively with brokers in a way that observational accounts cannot (e.g., Levitsky 2014; Stokes et al 2013; Szwarcberg 2012a; Wang and Kurzman 2007).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party’s Capacity to Monitor Brokers

2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Despite its prevalence, little is known about when parties buy turnout. We emphasize the problem of parties monitoring local brokers with incentives to shirk. Our model suggests that parties extract greater turnout buying effort from their brokers where they can better monitor broker performance and where favorable voters would not otherwise turn out. Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of polling stations—and thus electoral information about broker performance—in Mexican electoral precincts, we find that greater monitoring capacity increases turnout and votes for the National Action Party (PAN) and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the effect of monitoring capacity on PRI votes varies nonlinearly with the distance of voters to the polling station: it first increases because rural voters—facing larger costs of voting—generally favor the PRI, before declining as the cost of incentivizing brokers increases. This nonlinearity is not present for the PAN, who stand to gain less from mobilizing rural voters.

show abstract

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 90%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party’s Capacity to Monitor Brokers

2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…To our knowledge, onlyLeon (2017) and us are turnout studies in developing countries that rely on survey information merged with administrative data for the main outcome variable. Attrition is a cost to doing this.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Urbanization Patterns, Information Diffusion, and Female Voting in Rural Paraguay

Chong

León‐Ciliotta

Roza

et al. 2018

American J Political Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We use a field experiment to evaluate the impact of two informational get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns to boost female electoral participation in rural areas of Paraguay. We find that public rallies have a small and insignificant effect either on registration or voter turnout in the 2013 presidential elections. Households that received door-to-door canvasing treatment (D2D) are 4.6 percentage points more likely to vote. Experimental variation on the intensity of the treatment at the locality level allows us to estimate spillover effects, which are present in localities that are geographically more concentrated, which may favor social interactions and diffusion of information. Reinforcement effects to the already treated population are twice as large as diffusion effects to the untreated. Our results underscore the importance of taking into account urbanization patterns when designing informational campaigns.

show abstract

Authoritarian clientelism: the case of the president’s ‘creatures’ in Cameroon

Mișcoiu

Kakdeu

2021

Acta Polit

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Within this article, we aim at exploring the topic of clientelism in Cameroon as a species of a wider phenomenon affecting Central and Western Francophone Africa. Our argument is that, in spite of the repeated efforts of reinforcing the local power structures, we have witnessed a process of centralisation of clientelism: the new networks are shaped around the ‘Creatures’, who are the President Paul Biya’s formal or informal appointees and play the role of nodal elements relying the rest of the chain to the central command. This happened on the expenses of the locally dispersed and more autonomous clientelistic groups that were either included in or smashed by the pyramidal Creatures’ structured. In order to test our assumption, we analysed a specific body of literature on the theorization of clientelism and on its African and Cameroonian specificity and organized four focus groups with the actual and former members of the clientelistic chains at different levels (central, regional and local). If our main presupposition proved to be generally correct, one of the sub-arguments was only partially validated through this empirical component of our research.

show abstract

Turnout, Political Preferences and Information: Experimental Evidence from Perú

Cited by 3 publications

References 76 publications

Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party’s Capacity to Monitor Brokers

Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party’s Capacity to Monitor Brokers

Urbanization Patterns, Information Diffusion, and Female Voting in Rural Paraguay

Authoritarian clientelism: the case of the president’s ‘creatures’ in Cameroon

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About