Turkish migration to Europe: a modified gravity model analysis

Dedeoğlu, Dinçer; Genç, Hamdi

doi:10.1186/s40176-017-0097-z

Cited by 12 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…It represents the power of migration networks because a larger Turkish population in a member state means having a more powerful migration network to provide support to newcomers. Like other studies (Dedeoglu and Genç 2017), the findings show that migration networks make that country a more likely migration destination. The estimation indicates that a 1 percent rise in Turkish migration stock in a member state in 2005 increases the number of first permits issued for Turkish citizens by 0.62 percent (see Table 5).…”

Section: Empirical Findings and Discussionsupporting

confidence: 82%

“…The destination choice is also affected by the distance between the destination and the country of origin (Dedeoglu and Genç 2017). Distance increases travel costs and time, and limits the available means of transportation.…”

Section: Geographical Driversmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Others (Geis et al 2015;Mayda 2010;Tabor et al 2015) demonstrated the significance of non-economic factors such as quality of life, safety, environment, and cultural similarity, as well as a migrant-friendly perception, good education and health systems, and the existence of migration networks. Dedeoglu and Genç (2017) examined Turkey as a home country, focusing on migration drivers for 31 European destination countries. They drew on the gravity model, which emphasizes distance over migration destinations.…”

Section: Modeling the Drivers Of Migration Destinationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This article empirically investigates the main motivations for Turkish people to migrate to EU destinations and contributes to the literature by paying special attention to Turkish newcomers in the twenty-first century. 2 Unlike previous studies (Dedeoglu and Genç 2017;Fafchamps and Shilpi 2013;Jennissen 2003;Mayda 2010;Nica 2015;Pânzaru 2013;Tabor et al 2015;Van Der Gaag and Van Wissen 2008;Winter 2019) which relied on migration stock data, this article aims to identify the relevant drivers of Turkish migrants' EU destinations in the 2000s and 2010s using migration flow data at the macro level. The scope is limited to Turkish people in the EU-28 who obtained their first long-term residence permits (i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The European Union as a destination of Turkish migrants in 2008–2018

Dudu

Rojo

2022

New Perspect. Turk.

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In the 1950s and 1960s, Europe was a popular migration destination for Turkish people due to its employment opportunities. Today, however, these labor market drivers of migration destinations in the EU-28 have been superseded. This article empirically investigates the drivers of the migration destinations of Turkish newcomers to EU countries between 2008–2018. It contributes to the literature by focusing only on Turkish newcomers, whereas other studies rely on migration stock data. Using data provided by the OECD, Eurostat, and the World Bank, the findings show that security-based and social drivers mostly attract Turkish newcomers to EU-28 destinations, specifically a demand for democracy and social networks.

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Section: Empirical Findings and Discussionsupporting

confidence: 82%

Section: Geographical Driversmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Modeling the Drivers Of Migration Destinationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The European Union as a destination of Turkish migrants in 2008–2018

Dudu

Rojo

2022

New Perspect. Turk.

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“…1 There were several waves of migration from Turkey to Europe for socio-economic and political reasons (Dedeoğlu and Genç 2017). Political migrants or asylum-seekers originated from ethnic or religious minorities and are referred to as the Kurdish or Alevi diaspora ( Başer 2012 ;Massicard 2011 ).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Home State Oriented Diaspora Organizations and the Making of Partisan Citizens Abroad: Motivations, Discursive Frames, and Actions Towards Co-Opting the Turkish Diaspora in Europe

Yabancı

2021

Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies

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What motivates diasporas to support undemocratic rule in their countries of origin while enjoying democratic freedoms in their countries of settlement? This study adopts a meso-level approach to answer this question, and focuses on the Turkish diaspora in Europe as a case study. Lately, the diaspora governance literature has focused on official diaspora institutions and the policies of countries of origin. This study, alternatively, highlights “diasporic civic space” as an arena entrenching authoritarian practices “at home.” It investigates the conditions under which diasporic civic space can be co-opted by undemocratic countries of origin and the role of “home state oriented diaspora organizations” in this process of co-optation. The study shows that diasporic civic space can offer resources to undemocratic regimes to mobilize previously dormant diaspora communities and create a support base abroad that is driven by nationalism and partisanship. The empirical discussion unveils four factors behind the successful mobilization of diasporas by undemocratic countries of origin: (1) nationalist sentiments among the diaspora; (2) motivations to get a share from the perks that may be meted out by home country government; (3) feelings of insecurity, fear, and marginalization as immigrants; and (4) the desire to assert one’s identity and cultural ties vis-à-vis the majority in countries of settlement. The findings are based on the case of the Turkish diasporic civic space in Europe, which has recently been mobilized by a diaspora organization with political ties to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Original data are drawn from semi-structured interviews conducted in 2018–2019 with members and representatives of major pro-AKP diaspora organization known as the Union of International Democrats (UID), as well as Alevi, Kurdish, and Islamist/conservative diaspora organizations in Sweden, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Germany. The findings contribute to the understanding of undemocratic home states’ non-coercive and de-territorialized governance practices beyond their borders.

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