Turkey: The Slippery Slope from Reformist to Revolutionary Polarization and Democratic Breakdown

Abstract

Under the Justice and Development Party AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey has become one of the most polarized countries in the world, and has undergone a significant democratic breakdown. This article explains how polarization and democratic breakdown happened, arguing that it was based on the built-in, perverse dynamics of an “authoritarian spiral of polarizing-cum-transformative politics.” Furthermore, I identify ten causal mechanisms that have produced pernicious polarization and democratic erosion. Turkey’s transformation since 2002 is an example of the broader phenomenon of democratic erosion under new elites and dominant groups. The causes and consequences of pernicious polarization are analyzed in terms of four subperiods: 2002–2006, 2007, 2008–2013, and 2014–present. In the end, what began as a potentially reformist politics of polarization-cum-transformation morphed into an autocratic-revolutionary one. During this process, polarization and AKP policies; the politicization of formative rifts that had been a divisive undercurrent since nation-state formation; structural transformations; and the opposition’s organizational, programmatic, and personal shortcomings fed and reinforced each other.

Satisfaction with democracy in Turkey: Findings from a national survey

“…This suggests that, in Turkey, political winners’ high SWD is likely to be an extension of their support for the incumbent party rather than being the result of their evaluations of the performance of democratic institutions. This finding also supports the previous research indicating high levels of political polarization based on party identity in Turkey (Aydın-Düzgit and Balta, 2019; Somer, 2019). However, it is worrisome because political losers’ SWD is important for a democratic regime (Nadeau and Blais, 1993).…”

“…Polarization through political parties has increased considerably since the JDP came to power in 2002 (Yardımcı-Geyikçi, 2014), which resulted in significant differences between the winners and the losers, in terms of their social and political attitudes. During the 2014 and 2018 presidential elections and the 2017 referendum, the votes were divided into two mutually disagreeing blocs (Somer, 2019). Research also revealed significant differences between the winners and losers in Turkey, in terms of their views of state institutions (Örselli, 2016; Sahin and Akboga, 2019).…”

“…However, perceptions of the fairness of elections are important for citizens’ SWD, especially in divided societies (Norris, 2019). Turkey is a politically polarized and divided country (Aydın-Düzgit and Balta, 2019; Somer, 2019) in which a considerable share of citizens has doubts about the integrity of elections. Hence, our third hypothesis is as follows:…”

“…Second, past research has revealed that being a political winner has a positive effect on SWD (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Blais and Gélineau, 2007; Rich, 2015). Turkey is one of the most politically polarized countries in the world (Somer, 2019), where people’s party identity shapes their attitudes toward institutions. For example, political winners (incumbent party voters) have more positive evaluations of state institutions than political losers (opposition party voters) in Turkey (Sahin and Akboga, 2019).…”

Partisanship and Autocratization: Polarization, Power Asymmetry, and Partisan Social Identities in Turkey

“…Finally, after a coup attempt against him in July 2016 failed, Erdoğan assumed emergency powers and pushed through the parliament and popular vote a set of constitutional reforms that changed the country's once parliamentary regime into a hyperpresidential one. This process of autocratization was accompanied by intense political conflict along partisan lines and gave birth to the current partisan landscape (Somer, 2019).…”