Tuning-Free, Low Memory Robust Estimator to Mitigate GPS Spoofing Attacks

Lee, Jun-Hwan; Taha, Ahmad F.; Gatsis, Nikolaos; Akopian, David

doi:10.1109/lcsys.2019.2922497

Cited by 14 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…It is desirable to develop techniques that rely on readily available data at the navigation domain in the receiver, such as pseudoranges, pseudorange rates, and satellite-related information. Navigation domain countermeasures exploit statistics in pseudorange residuals or carrier-to-noise (CNR) ratio [26], [27], [28], drift-monitoring [29], sparsity characteristics of realistic spoofing profiles [21], [30], and robust estimation based on pseudoranges and pseudorange rates [31].…”

Section: A Prior Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The works in [27], [29] focus mostly on developing spoofing detection schemes and do not readily yield corrected PVT estimates. The works in [21], [30], [31] focus on spoofing detection and mitigation of TSAs only. However, when spoofing attacks target both time and position domains, the aforementioned algorithms [21], [30], [31] are not generally capable of isolating and mitigating the TSA impact even for a static receiver.…”

Section: A Prior Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The works in [21], [30], [31] focus on spoofing detection and mitigation of TSAs only. However, when spoofing attacks target both time and position domains, the aforementioned algorithms [21], [30], [31] are not generally capable of isolating and mitigating the TSA impact even for a static receiver. A need therefore arises to develop spoofing mitigation methods addressing both position and timing related domains.…”

Section: A Prior Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Detection and Mitigation of Spoofing Attacks Against Time Synchronization and Positioning

Lee,

Schmidt,

Gatsis

et al. 2023

IEEE Access

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers are vulnerable to intentional spoofing attacks which can manipulate position, velocity, and time (PVT) measurements. Previous work has demonstrated that Time Synchronization Attacks (TSAs) can be detected and mitigated using sparse optimization techniques which reveal spoofers' presence in inflicted signals' derivative domains. Aiming to provide an efficient protection algorithm against spoofing, this paper expands the scope of the sparse signal processing framework to address more complicated attacks for stationary and low-dynamic receivers. In particular, TSAs against stationary receivers should be addressed differently if the position and velocity are manipulated by the spoofer at the same time. A new sparse processing method is presented employing a novel linearization of the measurement equation that includes attacks against time, position, and velocity. The method is assessed against both authentically and synthetically spoofed signals to verify its robustness in two test beds: 1) a lab-based software defined GPS receiver, and 2) a commercial hand-held device.

show abstract

Section: A Prior Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Prior Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Prior Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Detection and Mitigation of Spoofing Attacks Against Time Synchronization and Positioning

Lee,

Schmidt,

Gatsis

et al. 2023

IEEE Access

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Lift-off spoofing prevent the receiver from losing lock, which allows to remain concealed [12]. Since lift-off spoofing has become an important direction for the development of spoofing techniques, it is of practical importance to study how covert spoofing could be executed on target receivers during tracking stage [13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asynchronous Lift-Off Spoofing on Satellite Navigation Receivers in the Signal Tracking Stage

Gao

Zhang

2020

IEEE Sensors J.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing techniques are highly stealthy and pose a tremendous risk to targets using GNSS technology, studies on GNSS spoofing techniques have been in the spotlight. If the accurate position and velocity of the target receiver can be obtained, the target receiver can be covertly spoofed during the signal tracking stage using synchronous lift-off spoofing. However, it is often difficult to accurately obtain the position and velocity of a target in real GNSS spoofing scenarios. To address this problem, To study the effects of spoofing signals' power (relative to the real signal), code pulling rate, carrier Doppler shift, initial code phase difference, and carrier phase difference on the efficacy of spoofing, the intrusion of receiver's signal tracking loop by spoofing signals is mathematically modeled. Based on the model, an asynchronous lift-off spoofing for GNSS receivers in the signal tracking stage is proposed. Theoretical analysis and experimental results show that the new method resulted in stable Doppler frequency variations, short fluctuations in carrier-to-noise ratio (C/N) and signal lock time, and gentle changes to the receiver's 3D Earth-Centered Earth Fixed (ECEF) coordinates, when the target's position and velocity were approximately known during the intrusion period. The proposed spoofing method is highly feasible and could expand the scope of applicability of lift-off spoofing.

show abstract

“…Another effective resilient state estimator has been proposed in [26], where the impacts of perturbations to the impedance of transmission lines in power systems have been analysed. In [27], robust dynamic state estimation (DSE) against spoofing cyber‐attacks has been fulfilled in global positioning systems. In [28–30], the KF has been used for detection of the cyber‐attacks in the DSE process.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient resilient dynamic co‐estimation framework for cyber‐physical systems under sensor attacks

Kazemi

Safavi

Setoodeh

2020

IET Control Theory & Appl

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this study, a novel co‐estimation approach is proposed for dynamic state estimation of cyber‐physical systems (CPSs) subjected to sensor attacks. In the proposed approach, the sensory measurements are preprocessed to extract some valuable information about the launched cyber‐attack. This information is then manipulated to form new state equations, which are augmented with the CPS model. The newly obtained model effectively represents the behaviour of both the CPS states as well as the launched cyber‐attack, and can be used for their co‐estimation. Two structures are suggested for the preprocessing of the sensory measurements that deploy Kalman filter (KF) and two‐step KF for co‐estimation of the states and cyber‐attacks. To effectively handle the concurrent effects of cyber‐attacks and unknown inputs on the CPS co‐estimation process, some auxiliary outputs are generated using high‐gain approximate differentiators to realise the required matching conditions. The proposed dynamic co‐estimation approach improves accuracy via considering the inter‐correlation between the CPS states and the cyber‐attacks. To demonstrate the viability of the proposed co‐estimation method, thorough stability and feasibility analysis are provided. Furthermore, extensive simulations are performed on a well‐known CPS‐the IEEE 14‐bus test system‐ to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

show abstract

Tuning-Free, Low Memory Robust Estimator to Mitigate GPS Spoofing Attacks

Cited by 14 publications

References 22 publications

Detection and Mitigation of Spoofing Attacks Against Time Synchronization and Positioning

Detection and Mitigation of Spoofing Attacks Against Time Synchronization and Positioning

Asynchronous Lift-Off Spoofing on Satellite Navigation Receivers in the Signal Tracking Stage

Efficient resilient dynamic co‐estimation framework for cyber‐physical systems under sensor attacks

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About