Can a truth-bearer be true but not determinately so? 1 On the enduringly popular standard supervaluational conception of indeterminacy, under which the principle of bivalence is invalid, the answer is a straightforward No. On such a conception, truth just is determinate truth-truth in all admissible interpretations. 2 For that reason, a more interesting question is: can a truth-bearer be true but not determinately so on a conception of indeterminacy under which both classical semantics and classical logic remain valid? 3 Under such a conception, very roughly, a truth-bearer is indeterminate in truth-value just in case it is either true or false but it is not determinate that this truth-bearer is true and not determinate that it is false. Within such a classical framework, the possibility of indeterminate truth has proved to be at best elusive, at worst, incoherent. On this score, Crispin Wright alleges that it does not seem intelligible that there should be any way for an utterance to be true save by being definitely true-at any rate, there is no species of indefinite truth (Wright 1995, p. 143; see also Wright 1987;Dummett 1975).And in a similar vein, Tim Williamson puts the challenge this way: Definite truth is supposed to be more than mere truth, and definite falsity more than mere falsity. But what more could it take for an utterance to be definitely true than just for it to be true? […] Such questions are equally pressing with 'false' in place of 'true'. Again, 'TW is thin' is no doubt definitely true if and only if TW is definitely thin, but what is the difference between being thin and being definitely thin? Is it like the difference between being thin and being very thin? Can 'definitely' be explained in other terms, or are we supposed to grasp it as primitive? (1994, pp. 194-195; see also his 1995). 'Indeterminate Truth', P. Greenough, to appear in P. French (ed.) Truth and its Deformities, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2008.