Truthful multi-attribute auction with discriminatory pricing in cognitive radio networks

Abstract

In this paper, we design a market-based channel allocation scheme for cognitive radio networks by exploiting multi-attribute channel-aware auctions to consider channel diversity in frequency, time, and space domains. Different from existing research, our objective is to maximize the winning SUs' service satisfaction degree while enhancing the utilities of winning PUs and SUs, which can effectively encourage them to join the auction and improve the sustainability of the spectrum market. Based on an elaborately devised preference function, we allocate channels to SUs satisfying their demands while considering spatial and temporal channel reuse to enhance channel utilization. Moreover, we propose a discriminatory pricing method to enhance the utilities of winning PUs and SUs. A comprehensive analysis indicates that our multi-attribute auction is individually-rational, ex-post budget balanced, value-truthful, and attribute-truthful. Our simulation results indicate that the proposed multi-attribute auction can significantly increase the winners' utilities and ensure SUs' service satisfaction.

An extensible and flexible truthful auction framework for heterogeneous spectrum markets

“…Note that bandwidth-truthfulness is defined for buyers (SUs) only, as sellers (PUs) have no incentive to lie about their available channel bandwidths since such information is generally public [10]. Definition 1.…”

“…Over the past few years a number of auction mechanisms [1,[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][18][19][20][21][22] have been proposed as a powerful marketbased spectrum management technique to improve the channel utilization while benefiting both the primary and the secondary users in a spectrum market. The major design goal of these auction schemes focuses on truthfulness to prevent market manipulation, by ensuring that no buyer/seller can obtain a larger utility via cheating on its bid price.…”

“…Nevertheless, a systematic study to reveal the correlations among VCG, MOM, and McAfee is missing, making it hard to select an appropriate auction mechanism for practical settings. Fourth, attribute-aware auctions have been sporadically studied [4,6,10], but no effort has been made to explicitly link the benefit brought by attribute diversity to the auction objectives (maximum social welfare or expected revenue), resulting in the "hardness" of analyzing the effect of auction outputs on networking performance (e.g., throughput).…”

“…Such a seller model has been adopted by almost all existing research [4,7,10,11,18,19,21]. We will consider the more practical scenario when sellers bid for each particular area (spatial diversity) in our future research.…”

Distributed back-pressure scheduling with opportunistic routing in cognitive radio networks

“…The cognitive radio (CR) technique allows unlicensed users (secondary users (SUs)) to opportunistically access the licensed spectrum without interfering with licensed users (primary users (PUs)) to exploit the under-utilized portion of the spectrum [7][8][9]. The coexistence of PUs and SUs makes it infeasible to directly adopt the routing algorithms designed for general multi-hop wireless networks, as the links can be highly dynamic due to the existence of PUs.…”