Truthful Algorithms for Scheduling Selfish Tasks on Parallel Machines

Angel, Éric; Bampis, Evripidis; Pascual, Fanny

doi:10.1007/11600930_70

Cited by 27 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Very recently, [10] considered as an objective the weighted sum of completion times. Truthful coordination mechanisms have been studied in [1,7,2].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If λ 2 ≤ Rλ 1 , modified Nash is identical to Nash. If λ 2 > Rλ 1 , the modified algorithm freezes the flow across the first link at r 2 /2 once it reaches this level, i.e.,l 1 …”

Section: Two Linksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A feasible flow f that routes r units of flow from s to t is at Nash (or Wardrop [29]) Equilibrium 1 if for p 1 , p 2 ∈ P with f p 1 …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Improving the Price of Anarchy for Selfish Routing via Coordination Mechanisms

2013

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We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value 4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel links, known as Pigou's network. We improve upon the value 4/3 by means of Coordination Mechanisms.We increase the latency functions of the edges in the network, i.e., if ℓ e (x) is the latency function of an edge e, we replace it byl e (x) with ℓ e (x) ≤l e (x) for all x. Then an adversary fixes a demand rate as input. The engineered Price of Anarchy of the mechanism is defined as the worst-case ratio of the Nash social cost in the modified network over the optimal social cost in the original network. Formally, ifĈ N (r) denotes the cost of the worst Nash flow in the modified network for rate r and C opt (r) denotes the cost of the optimal flow in the original network for the same rate thenWe first exhibit a simple coordination mechanism that achieves for any network of parallel links an engineered Price of Anarchy strictly less than 4/3. For the case of two parallel links our basic mechanism gives 5/4 = 1.25. Then, for the case of two parallel links, we describe an optimal mechanism; its engineered Price of Anarchy lies between 1.191 and 1.192.

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“…Very recently, [10] considered as an objective the weighted sum of completion times. Truthful coordination mechanisms have been studied in [1,7,2].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If λ 2 ≤ Rλ 1 , modified Nash is identical to Nash. If λ 2 > Rλ 1 , the modified algorithm freezes the flow across the first link at r 2 /2 once it reaches this level, i.e.,l 1 …”

Section: Two Linksmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Improving the Price of Anarchy for Selfish Routing via Coordination Mechanisms

2013

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“…The network is as depicted on Figure 1b, without the dashed arc. There are two paths and the configuration which splits evenly the traffic on those paths is the only equilibrium, inducing a social cost of 3n 2 2 . Now suppose that a very fast road is built from node D to C, such that every player using that arc at D joins immediately C, ignoring the congestion on the arc (see the dashed arc on Figure 1b).…”

Section: Social Cost-efficiency Of Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless many models were investigated in the literature (see for example [3,2,42,6,19,18,39] for a non exhaustive list of results), depending on several parameters: the players are either the jobs or the machines, payments are allowed or not, the strategy of an agents is vector or a singleton, pre-emption is allowed or not, etc. Here we present some results which apply for a model close to the one mainly discussed in this chapter.…”

Section: Selfish Scheduling and Truthfulnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Scheduling Games: Equilibria and Efficiency

Gourvès

Monnot

Telelis

2011

Just-in-Time Systems

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Coordination Mechanisms

Christodoulou

Koutsoupias

Nanavati

2004

Automata, Languages and Programming

122

145

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We introduce the notion of coordination mechanisms to improve the performance in systems with independent selfish and non-colluding agents. The quality of a coordination mechanism is measured by its price of anarchy-the worst-case performance of a Nash equilibrium over the (centrally controlled) social optimum. We give upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy for selfish task allocation and congestion games.

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Truthful Algorithms for Scheduling Selfish Tasks on Parallel Machines

Cited by 27 publications

References 9 publications

Improving the Price of Anarchy for Selfish Routing via Coordination Mechanisms

Improving the Price of Anarchy for Selfish Routing via Coordination Mechanisms

Strategic Scheduling Games: Equilibria and Efficiency

Coordination Mechanisms

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