Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge

Wright, Cory

doi:10.1080/00048400902941315

Cited by 31 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 23 publications

(22 reference statements)

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“…This constraint comes from those who favour a particular methodological approach to the study of truth, which holds that a candidate truth property must exhibit a set of features outlined in a list of platitudes about truth. This is discussed in more detail below, but it is an approach shared by many alethic pluralists (see, e.g., Wright 1992, Lynch 2009, Wright 2010, Edwards 2011 10 What might be meant by 'robust' here is discussed below. The option that will receive the most attention is the thought that one important dimension for assessing the robustness of a property is the sparseness of that property.…”

Section: Simple Disjunctivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…11 11 I should note that my main aim in this paper is to show that alethic disjunctivism is a viable position for an alethic pluralist, as opposed to evaluating other formulations of the view. I will also remain neutral on the issue of whether disjunctive properties are identical to second‐order properties, and thus whether the considerations offered here may be used to support the versions of alethic pluralism presented in Lynch 2001; 2004a; 2006 and Wright 2010. …”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

“…9 9 This constraint comes from those who favour a particular methodological approach to the study of truth, which holds that a candidate truth property must exhibit a set of features outlined in a list of platitudes about truth. This is discussed in more detail below, but it is an approach shared by many alethic pluralists (see, e.g., Wright 1992, Lynch 2009, Wright 2010, Edwards 2011). …”

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confidence: 99%

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On Alethic Disjunctivism

Edwards¹

2012

Dialectica

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Alethic pluralism is the view that truth requires different treatment in different domains of discourse. The basic idea is that different properties play important roles in the analysis of truth in different domains of discourse, such as discourse about the material world, moral discourse, and mathematical discourse, to take three examples. Alethic disjunctivism is a kind of alethic pluralism, and is the view that truth is to be identified with the disjunctive property that is formed using each of the domain‐specific properties as disjuncts (i.e., in the view's simplest form, truth is the property of either having domain‐specific property 1, or domain‐specific property 2, and so on). This paper evaluates the prospects for alethic disjunctivism. In particular, it outlines the proper formulation of the view, and assesses some concerns that the disjunctive property lacks the pedigree necessary to be considered a truth property. I begin by briefly outlining the motivations for alethic pluralism, before noting four general constraints on formulations of the view. I then consider a ‘simple’ formulation of alethic disjunctivism, and recommend an amendment. I then demonstrate that the candidate truth property specified by this new formulation is able to meet the central constraints required for it to be considered a viable formulation of alethic pluralism. The final part of this demonstration involves making some distinctions between different kinds of disjunctive properties, and arguing that disjunctive properties are not necessarily highly abundant properties: some are more sparse than others.

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Section: Simple Disjunctivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 98%

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confidence: 99%

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On Alethic Disjunctivism

Edwards¹

2012

Dialectica

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“…My objective, in this article, is not to discuss the ontological and logical difficulties which alethic functionalism encounters (C.D. Wright 2010, Pedersen 2010), but to concentrate on the specific issue from which much of this discussion started, that of the normative role of truth. In particular I want to concentrate on the two following so-called "truisms":…”

Section: (Ds) Is True If and Only If Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alethic Functionalism and the Norm of Belief

Engel¹

2013

Truth and Pluralism

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“…There is also a previous version of the view put forward by Lynch (2001a, 2004a) and discussed in detail by C. D. Wright (2010).…”

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confidence: 99%

Simplifying Alethic Pluralism

Edwards

2011

The Southern J of Philosophy

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What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth‐bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination pluralism,” that I claim offers better prospects for alethic pluralism, with the potential to have applications for pluralist theories beyond truth.

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Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge

Cited by 31 publications

References 23 publications

On Alethic Disjunctivism

On Alethic Disjunctivism

Alethic Functionalism and the Norm of Belief

Simplifying Alethic Pluralism

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