Truth Pluralism and Many-valued Logics: A Reply to Beall

Tappolet, Christine

doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00195

Cited by 63 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Without a homogenous, general, and unequivocal concept of truth, our ability to talk about the veridicality of assertoric or doxastic discourse is jeopardized. Strong alethic pluralists who do so must have a rough and ready reply as to how there can be multiple ways of being true, or, if there is a plurality of ways of being true, then why a more general truth predicate -the one that does the inferential operations -does not subsume all the other fine-grained, contextualized truth predicates (Tappolet 2000). And weak alethic pluralists must not only have a principled way of maintaining the weak/strong distinction, but one that also allows their view to remain pluralistic.…”

Section: The Plight Of Alethic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth

Wright

2005

Synthese

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Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from inflationary approaches' allegiance to alethic monism, pluralist approaches are able to avoid this explanatory inadequacy and the resulting skepticism, though at the cost of inviting other conceptual difficulties. A novel approach, alethic functionalism, attempts to circumvent the problems faced by pluralist approaches while preserving their main insights. Unfortunately, it too generates additional problems -namely, with its suspect appropriation of the multiple realizability paradigm and its platitude-based strategy -that need to be dissolved before it can constitute an adequate inflationary approach to the nature of truth.Synthese (2005) 145: 1-28

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Section: The Plight Of Alethic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth

Wright

2005

Synthese

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“…Moral truth, on such a position, might turn out be one sort of property; mathematical truth a completely different property. Consequently, we would not, for example, be able to explain validity in the usual way: as the preservation of truth from the premises to the conclusion (see Tappolet 1997Tappolet , 2000Beall 2000). For a mixed inference such as ''murder is wrong or two plus two is five; two and two are not five, therefore murder is wrong'', would end up not preserving any single property from premises to conclusion if each of its premises, were true in a completely different sense.…”

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confidence: 99%

Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth

Lynch

2005

Synthese

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According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the view's main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes ''true'' as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.

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“…Beall concludes that by adopting a many-valued logic, pluralists can accept the validity of mixed inferences and maintain that the premises can be true in different ways. Tappolet (2000) offered a reply to Beall. Contrary to Beall's assessment of Tappolet's argument as a dilemma, Tappolet presents her argument as a trilemma.…”

Section: The Mixed Inferences Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Metaphysics of Mixed Inferences: Problems with Functionalist Accounts of Alethic Pluralism

Nulty

2010

Int Ontology Metaphysics

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Alethic pluralists argue truth is a metaphysically robust higher-order property that is multiply realized by a set of diverse and domain-specific subvening alethic properties. The higher-order truth property legitimizes mixed inferences and accounts for a univocal truth predicate. Absent of this higher-order property, pluralists lack an account of the validity of mixed inferences and an adequate semantics for the truth predicate and thereby appear forced to abandon the central tenets of alethic pluralism. I argue the use of many-valued logics to support pluralism fails to address the pluralist's metaphysical problem regarding mixed inferences and mixed truth functional connectives. The high degree of heterogeneity of the alethic realizers (unlike the realizers for pain) challenges the plausibility of a single higher-order functional property. A functional property with such a heterogeneous base cannot be projectable at a theoretically significant level. The problem with mixed inferences and truth functions is but one symptom of the deeper projectability problem. ) that truth is a multiply realized supervenient property. Despite its supervenient status, truth is an objective, higher-order kind which has explanatory power not reducible to its disjunctive base properties. Supervenient functionalism about truth is motivated by an attempt to avoid problems associated with strong alethic pluralism (SAP). SAP states the concept of truth affords more than one robust account; the robust accounts are pluralistic because they vary with domain e.g., the moral domain, the mathematical domain, and the domain of truths about the physical world. Truth is Int Ontology Metaphysics (2010) 11:153-162

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Truth Pluralism and Many-valued Logics: A Reply to Beall

Cited by 63 publications

References 2 publications

On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth

On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth

Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth

The Metaphysics of Mixed Inferences: Problems with Functionalist Accounts of Alethic Pluralism

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