Truth Pluralism and Many-Valued Logic: Lesson from Suszko’s Thesis

Abstract

According to truth pluralism, sentences from different areas of discourse can be true in different ways. This view has been challenged to make sense of logical validity, understood as necessary truth preservation, when inferences involving different areas are considered. To solve this problem, a natural temptation is that of replicating the standard practice in many-valued logic by appealing to the notion of designated values. Such a simple approach, however, is usually considered a non-starter for strong versions of truth pluralism, since designation seems to embody nothing but a notion of generic truth. In this paper, I explore the analogy with many-valued logic by comparing the problem of mixed inferences with Suszko’s thesis, and argue that the strong pluralist has room to resist the commitment to a generic property of truth by undermining the semantic significance of Suszko’s reduction.

Неклассический Взгляд На Природу Значений Истинности

“…Анализируя тезис Сушко и Редукцию Сушко, А. Стролло приходит к схожим выводам [Strollo, 2022]. Он усматривает в рассуждении Сушко отождествление выделенности референциального значения с семантическим значением предложения, свойством истины (property of truth).…”

“…Devyatkin L.Yu. "Neklassicheskij vzglyad na prirodu znachenij istinnosti" [A non-classical view of the nature of truth values], Logicheskie Issledovaniya / Logical Investigations, 2022, Vol. 28, No.…”