Truth, Justice, and Justification

Ho, H. L.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228300.003.0002

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“…However, he set these situations aside, explaining that he was concerned ‘with cases in which mathematical methods are turned to the task of deciding what occurred on a particular, unique occasion , as opposed to cases in which the very task defined by the applicable law is that of measuring the statistical characteristics or likely effects of some process or the statistical features of some population of people or events’ (1971: 1338–1339, emphasis mine). More recently, this has also been emphasised by Koehler (2002: 386), Ferrer Beltrán (2007: 105–106), Allen & Pardo (2007: 114, 2021: 305), Ho (2008: 141), Enoch & Fisher (2015: 585–586), Pardo (2019: 265), among others.…”

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confidence: 88%

“… 7. For an overview of these proof paradoxes along with other hypothetical cases, see Frosini (2002: 65–86), Redmayne (2008), Ho (2008: 135–143), Gardiner (2018), Pardo (2019: 253–266), Ross (2020), Spottswood (2021), among others. It is noteworthy that when other cases are mentioned in these contributions, they all share the same characteristics that I will identify in a moment.…”

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“… 34. For an overview of the various versions of the not-just-probabilities argument and the criticisms they receive, see: Redmayne (2008), Ho (2008: 135–143), Pundik (2008b, 2011), Blome-Tillmann (2015), Enoch & Fisher (2015: 565–571), Gardiner (2018), Dahlman (2020: 168–177), Dahlman & Pundik (2021).…”

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A missing piece in the debate about naked statistical evidence

Giles

2023

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

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In this article, I want to draw attention to a class of cases that is ignored, sometimes deliberately, in the debate about the probative value of naked statistical evidence (NSE). I am talking about cases in which ‘statistical’ propositions are the principal subject of proof. I will show that they are legally relevant and remain immune to the arguments against NSE put forward in the evidence literature. All of this, I will conclude, makes it convenient to pay more attention to them. First, I will highlight the hypothetical cases discussed in the NSE debate and the kind of propositions that must be proved in them: ‘singular’ propositions. Second, I will show that there are other cases, also relevant in legal systems, in which the principal factum probandum are ‘statistical’ propositions. Third, I will argue that this difference is substantial for the NSE debate.

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A missing piece in the debate about naked statistical evidence

Giles

2023

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

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“…Using this information—the arguments claim—is ‘inconsistent with the law’s commitment to treat the defendant as an autonomous individual, free to determine and alter his conduct at each moment’ (Wasserman, 1991: 943). In particular, using previous convictions as just described amounts to treating the defendant ‘as if her past conduct determines her present conduct’ (Duff et al, 2007: 114) and is ‘dismissive of his capacity to revise, or act against, his bad character’ (Ho, 2008: 300). While Redmayne is firm in denying that the use of previous convictions has a moral cost, his thoughts concerning the use of behavioural generalisations that do not express recidivism rates are more tentative.…”

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Generalisations, causal relationships and moral responsibility

Picinali

2016

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

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In Chapter 4 of his book Character in the Criminal Trial, Mike Redmayne addresses a series of non-epistemic arguments against the use of bad character evidence. Redmayne is particularly successful in debunking arguments focusing on the defendant’s autonomy. Inspired by the early drafts of Chapter 4—which I had the honour to read—I published an article trying to contribute to the debate. At the time of writing, however, I was not aware of a beguiling argument concerning the use of behavioural generalisations, formulated and defended by Amit Pundik in a recent research paper. According to this argument, we should not prove guilt using generalisations that presuppose a causal relationship between an antecedent factor and individual behaviour, if this relationship negates the freedom of the individual under any theory about determinism and free will that one may adopt—be it a libertarian or a compatibilist theory. In this article I critically assess this argument and attempt to show that it does not succeed.

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Truth, Justice, and Justification

Cited by 2 publications

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A missing piece in the debate about naked statistical evidence

A missing piece in the debate about naked statistical evidence

Generalisations, causal relationships and moral responsibility

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