Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost

Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science aims to reconsider the question of the unity of science in light of recent developments in logic. At present, no single logical, semantical or methodological framework dominates the philosophy of science. However, the editors of this series believe that formal techniques like, for example, independence friendly logic, dialogical logics, multimodal logics, game theoretic semantics and linear logics, have the potential to cast new light on basic issues in the discussion of the unity of science.This series provides a venue where philosophers and logicians can apply specific technical insights to fundamental philosophical problems. While the series is open to a wide variety of perspectives, including the study and analysis of argumentation and the critical discussion of the relationship between logic and the philosophy of science, the aim is to provide an integrated picture of the scientific enterprise in all its diversity.More information about this series at

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“…Proposition 8 is proven independently by (Meadows 2013). The departure from lf to E V ∞ ∪ ¬E V ∞ is smaller than to E C ∞ ∪ ¬E C ∞ .…”

Section: Definitionmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…We came to know(Meadows 2013) only after finishing a first version of the present paper. The main difference with the present work is thatMeadows (2013) does not arrive at the equivalence result by an analysis of conditions (V) and (L) in alethic jumps. As a consequence, the lesson he draws…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

Unifying the Philosophy of Truth

Achourioti

Galinon

Martínez-Fernández

et al. 2015

Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science

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“…16 Cf. Vugt & Bonnay (2009) or Meadows (2011). 17 Conditionality takes care of the first example, consistency takes care of the second example.…”

Section: Leitgebmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…cit.16 Cf Vugt & Bonnay (2009). orMeadows (2011).17 Conditionality takes care of the first example, consistency takes care of the second example.https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020313000282 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Axioms for Grounded Truth

Schindler

2013

Rev. symb. logic

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“…Some philosophical aspects of Leitgeb's truth theory are discussed in Meadows[15], to which we refer the interested reader. An axiomatic truth theory based on Leitgeb's truth theory can be found in Schindler[17].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Graph-Theoretic Analysis of the Semantic Paradoxes

Beringer¹,

Schindler²

2017

Bull. symb. log

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We introduce a framework for a graph-theoretic analysis of the semantic paradoxes. Similar frameworks have been recently developed for infinitary propositional languages by Cook [5, 6] and Rabern, Rabern, and Macauley [16]. Our focus, however, will be on the language of first-order arithmetic augmented with a primitive truth predicate. Using Leitgeb’s [14] notion of semantic dependence, we assign reference graphs (rfgs) to the sentences of this language and define a notion of paradoxicality in terms of acceptable decorations of rfgs with truth values. It is shown that this notion of paradoxicality coincides with that of Kripke [13]. In order to track down the structural components of an rfg that are responsible for paradoxicality, we show that any decoration can be obtained in a three-stage process: first, the rfg is unfolded into a tree, second, the tree is decorated with truth values (yielding a dependence tree in the sense of Yablo [21]), and third, the decorated tree is re-collapsed onto the rfg. We show that paradoxicality enters the picture only at stage three. Due to this we can isolate two basic patterns necessary for paradoxicality. Moreover, we conjecture a solution to the characterization problem for dangerous rfgs that amounts to the claim that basically the Liar- and the Yablo graph are the only paradoxical rfgs. Furthermore, we develop signed rfgs that allow us to distinguish between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ reference and obtain more fine-grained versions of our results for unsigned rfgs.

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Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost

Cited by 10 publications

References 12 publications

Unifying the Philosophy of Truth

Unifying the Philosophy of Truth

Axioms for Grounded Truth

A Graph-Theoretic Analysis of the Semantic Paradoxes

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