Trusted and Secure Design of Analog/RF ICs: Recent Developments

Subramani, Kiruba Sankaran; Volanis, Georgios; Bidmeshki, Mohammad-Mahdi; Antonopoulos, Angelos; Makris, Yiorgos

doi:10.1109/iolts.2019.8854461

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Embedded devices are attractive targets for today’s sophisticated and innovative attacks since they are not suitable for traditional security mechanisms, such as anti-virus and anomaly detectors, built for general-purpose computers. These attacks can be realized as hardware [ 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 ] and firmware modifications [ 17 ], known as Trojans. This wide range of attack space has resulted in exponentially increasing security problems.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Malicious Activity Detection in Lightweight Wearable and IoT Devices Using Signal Stitching

Karabacak

Ogras

Ozev

2021

Sensors

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The integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing process involves many players, from chip/board design and fabrication to firmware design and installation. In today’s global supply chain, any of these steps are prone to interference from rogue players, creating a security risk. Therefore, manufactured devices need to be verified to perform only their intended operations since it is not economically feasible to control the supply chain and use only trusted facilities. This paper presents a detection technique for malicious activity that can stem from hardware or firmware Trojans. The proposed technique relies on (i) repetitious side-channel sample collection of the active device, (ii) time-domain stitching, and (iii) frequency domain analysis. Since finding a trusted sample is generally impractical, the proposed technique is based on self-referencing to remove the effects of environmental or device-to-device variation in the frequency domain. We first observe that the power spectrum of the Trojan activity is confined to a low-frequency band. Then, we exploit this fact to achieve self-referencing using signal detection theory. The proposed technique’s effectiveness is demonstrated through experiments on a wearable electronics prototype and system-on-chip (SoC) under a variety of practical scenarios. Experimental results show the proposed detection technique enables a high overall detection coverage for malicious activities of varying types with 0.8 s monitoring time overhead, which is negligible.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Malicious Activity Detection in Lightweight Wearable and IoT Devices Using Signal Stitching

Karabacak

Ogras

Ozev

2021

Sensors

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“…Devastating impacts and effects of HT on national security have already been mentioned in the literature [10][11] such as failure of the radar system, problem in navigation and flight control in a Boeing 787, presence of HT in Dell server motherboards deployed in critical applications of US defense, etc. It is found that in the past decade extensive researches from industry, academia, and Govt have been conducted on understanding the different aspects of HT [12][13][14] and its detection [15][16][17][18] and Prevention [19,20] in digital circuits however the topic remains largely unexplored and missing in the analog/RF ICs [21][22][23][24][25]. It is because, it is very difficult and challenging to design HTs of stealthy nature, small footprint, and indistinguishable nature for analog circuits [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analog hardware trojan design and detection in OFDM based wireless cryptographic ICs

Ali

Farshad

2021

PLoS ONE

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Due to Hardware Trojan (HT), trustworthiness of Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain is a burning issue in Semiconductor Industry nowadays. Over the last decade, extensive research has been carried on HT detection methods for digital circuits. However, the HT issue remains largely unexplored in the domain of Analog Mixed Signal (AMS)/ RF circuit where it is now an appealing target for the attackers. The increasing popularity of Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) based wireless cryptographic ICs in modern communication systems makes it a lucrative target for HT-based attacks which could have a devastating impact on data security. This paper presents a trigger-based Hardware Trojan Threat model that exploits the extended cyclic prefix (ECP) property of the OFDM communication scheme to leak the secret encryption key over low noise Additive White Gaussian Channel (AWGN) and developed a Cyclic Prefix (CP) checker based detection mechanism named “SENTRY” to detect such trojans once it is triggered.

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