Trust and incentives for transboundary groundwater cooperation

Penny, Gopal; Müller-Itten, Michèle; Cobos, Gabriel de los; Mullen, Connor; Müller, Marc F.

doi:10.1016/j.advwatres.2021.104019

Cited by 10 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…This principle—known as the superposition principle—governs groundwater flows in confined aquifers. A comparable (though less tractable) game theoretical model based on an equivalent expression for (steady state) unconfined aquifers is discussed in (Penny, Mullen, et al., 2021; Penny, Müller‐Itten, et al., 2021).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This allows parameters α i and β i to be respectively interpreted as the unit price of pumped groundwater volume and the unit cost of pumping energy. Because formal markets for water are rare, α i is often a shadow price to be determined using proxies, such as the cost of conveyance infrastructure (Müller et al., 2017), or the cost of obtaining water from an alternative source (Penny, Müller‐Itten, et al., 2021). The linear form of the utility function implies that (a) the cost of drilling and setting up the pumps is small compared to the life‐time (energy) costs of operating them, (b) the shadow price of water is exogenously given and not itself affected by groundwater production (see Dang et al., 2016), (c) systemic costs of decreased water levels beyond pumping cost externalities (e.g., decreased streamflow production (Sahu & McLaughlin, 2021)) are neglected and (d) water is the limiting factor of production.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…obtaining water from an alternative source (Penny, Müller-Itten, et al, 2021). The linear form of the utility function implies that (a) the cost of drilling and setting up the pumps is small compared to the life-time (energy) costs of operating them, (b) the shadow price of water is exogenously given and not itself affected by groundwater production (see Dang et al, 2016), (c) systemic costs of decreased water levels beyond pumping cost externalities (e.g., decreased streamflow production (Sahu & McLaughlin, 2021)) are neglected and (d) water is the limiting of production.…”

Section: Modeling Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The quadratic utility function in Equations 1 and 2 is an extremely simplified representation of groundwater user incentives that has been used in previous work to parsimoniously capture the dynamics of pumping cost externalities in transboundary aquifers (e.g., Müller et al, 2017;Penny, Müller-Itten, et al, 2021). It relies on the following important assumptions that should be kept in mind when interpreting our results.…”

Section: Modeling Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hydro Economic Asymmetries and Common‐Pool Overdraft in Transboundary Aquifers

Mullen

Müller

Penny

et al. 2022

Water Resources Research

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The common‐pool nature of groundwater resources creates incentives to over pump that contribute to their rapid global depletion. In transboundary aquifers, users are separated by a territorial border and might face substantially different economic and hydrogeologic conditions that can alternatively dampen or amplify incentives to over pump. We develop a theoretical model that couples principles of game theory and groundwater flow to capture the combined effect of well locations and user asymmetries on pumping incentives. We find that heterogeneities across users (here referred to as asymmetries) in terms of either energy cost, groundwater profitability or aquifer response tend to dampen incentives to over pump. However, combinations of two or more types of asymmetry can substantially amplify common‐pool overdraft, particularly when the same user simultaneously faces comparatively higher costs (or aquifer response) and profitability. We use this theoretical insight to interpret the emergence of the Disi agreement between Saudi Arabia and Jordan in association with the Disi‐Amman water pipeline. By using bounded non‐dimensional parameters to encode user asymmetries and groundwater connectivity, the theory provides a tractable generalized framework to understand the premature depletion of shared aquifers, whether transboundary or not.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Modeling Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Modeling Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hydro Economic Asymmetries and Common‐Pool Overdraft in Transboundary Aquifers

Mullen

Müller

Penny

et al. 2022

Water Resources Research

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“…The external agent is willing to pay an amount of money to the players to encourage them to cooperate. Penny et al (2021) examined how treaties can emerge between the players pumping from aquifers. The external player can be considered as the subject that offers the payment so that such a treaty is made possible.…”

Section: Formulation Of the Coalitional Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Using Alternate Pumping and Cooperative Game Theory to Reduce Sea Water Intrusion

Nagkoulis

Katsifarakis

2022

Groundwater

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In this article, alternate pumping is studied as a means used to reduce the salinity concentration in coastal aquifers, pumped using a system of wells. This approach has been applied to a hypothetical confined coastal aquifer. Flow has been modeled, using SEAWAT. Two strategies are proposed based on cooperative game theory, to promote alternate pumping. In both strategies an external player will compensate the users that will pump during an unpopular pumping period. In the first strategy it is supposed that this external player aims at protecting a critical well, e.g. a municipal well, reducing its maximum salinity concentration by pumping alternately. In the second strategy proposed, the target is to reduce the overall salinity of the water pumped by the wells. In applying the cooperative game theory, the Shapley value is used to distribute the benefits of cooperation between the players (well users), according to their marginal contribution. Overall, well users can reduce sea water intrusion by cooperatively changing their pumping time schedules. The game theoretical model developed is a useful tool to promote cooperation toward this direction. The methods applied in the hypothetical aquifer, can be tested in actual aquifers to reduce sea water intrusion.

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Mapping the landscape of water and society research: Promising combinations of compatible and complementary disciplines

Muller,

Rusca,

Bertassello

et al. 2023

WIREs Water

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Coupled human‐water systems (CHWS) are diverse and have been studied across a wide variety of disciplines. Integrating multiple disciplinary perspectives on CHWS provides a comprehensive and actionable understanding of these complex systems. While interdisciplinary integration has often remained elusive, specific combinations of disciplines might be comparably easier to integrate (compatible), and/or their combination might be particularly likely to uncover previously unobtainable insights (complementary). This paper systematically identifies such promising combinations by mapping disciplines along a common set of topical, philosophical, and methodological dimensions. It also identifies key challenges and lessons for multidisciplinary research teams seeking to integrate highly promising (complementary) but poorly compatible disciplines. Applied to eight disciplines that span the environmental physical sciences and the quantitative and qualitative social sciences, we found that promising combinations of disciplines identified by the typology broadly reproduce patterns of recent interdisciplinary collaborative research revealed by a bibliometric analysis. We also found that some disciplines are centrally located within the typology by being compatible and complementary to multiple other disciplines along distinct dimensions. This points to the potential for these disciplines to act as catalysts for wider interdisciplinary integration.This article is categorized under: Engineering Water > Methods Human Water > Methods Science of Water > Methods

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Trust and incentives for transboundary groundwater cooperation

Cited by 10 publications

References 43 publications

Hydro Economic Asymmetries and Common‐Pool Overdraft in Transboundary Aquifers

Hydro Economic Asymmetries and Common‐Pool Overdraft in Transboundary Aquifers

Using Alternate Pumping and Cooperative Game Theory to Reduce Sea Water Intrusion

Mapping the landscape of water and society research: Promising combinations of compatible and complementary disciplines

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