Trump and the Politics of International Religious Freedom

Haynes, Jeffrey

doi:10.3390/rel11080385

Cited by 16 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…In other words, there may be more religious groups participating from less-religious Europe than from the more-religious North America because of the former's European outlook as opposed to its religious mores. Or it may simply be because "most Americans have no interest in imposing their faith on others and, with the exception of policy toward Israel, religion has little bearing on how they think about international affairs" [126]-although Americans do seem comfortable utilizing religion to promote "religious freedom, tolerance, and interfaith dialogue" [127], sometimes even to the arguable detriment of other populations [127][128][129], a trend manifested most plainly during the administration of former U.S. Pres. Donald Trump [128,129].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

COP and the Cloth: Quantitatively and Normatively Assessing Religious NGO Participation at the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Krantz

2021

Sci

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How much is religion quantitatively involved in global climate politics? After assessing the role of the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change from a normative perspective, this descriptive, transdisciplinary and unconventional study offers the first comprehensive quantitative examination of religious nongovernmental organizations that formally participate in its annual meetings, the largest attempts to solve the climate crisis through global governance. This study finds that although their numbers are growing, only about 3 percent of registered nongovernmental organizations accredited to participate in the conference are overtly religious in nature—and that more than 80 percent of those faith-based groups are Christian. Additionally, this study finds that religious nongovernmental organizations that participate in the conference are mostly from the Global North. The results call for greater participation of religious institutions in the international climate negotiations in order for society to address the planetary emergency of climate change.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

COP and the Cloth: Quantitatively and Normatively Assessing Religious NGO Participation at the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Krantz

2021

Sci

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“…Evangelical Christians formed a key part of the electoral coalition supporting the Trump (Margolis, 2020). This, in turn, meant that the administration needed to ensure their continued support, which it did in a number of ways; most importantly, by reshaping America's international religious freedom (IRF) policy (Haynes, 2020b). The increasing influence of evangelical groups and the subsequent shift in US IRF policy gave Hungary an opportunity to signal that it has common interests and values with the Trump administration.…”

Section: Paragi and Szent-iványi 229mentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Hungary’s Support for Persecuted Christians: Scrutinising Religious Motives for Giving Aid

Paragi,

Szent-Iványi

2024

Progress in Development Studies

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Religion is increasingly acknowledged as a driving force behind development processes; however, it has received little attention as a motivation for donors to give aid. The article analyses the stated motivations and hidden agendas behind the Hungarian government’s ‘Hungary Helps’ aid programme, aimed at supporting Christian communities in the Global South and reducing migration to Europe. The programme fits with the government’s rhetoric on religion and migration, however, the article reveals inconsistencies that suggest further motivations. While there is little evidence that there was domestic demand for such a programme, it has been used instrumentally to increase Hungary’s influence among Christian interest groups and their political allies in the USA.

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“…Outside of Europe and in the United States, Republican Party Presidential candidate Donald Trump used civilizational rhetoric during his 2016 campaign, while as Brubaker notes, Trump did not dwell strongly on civilizational politics as many European populist parties, (Brubaker 2017(Brubaker , p. 1207, he described the United States as a Judeo-Christian nation, and promised to protect America from Islam, which Trump claimed "hates us" (Haynes 2020). As a candidate for President Trump, like his European populist counterparts, singled out Islam as an enemy civilization, and did not claim that other religious minorities belonged to incompatible cultures.…”

Section: Civilizational Populismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Civilizational Populism: Definition, Literature, Theory, and Practice

Yilmaz

Morieson

2022

Religions

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The purpose of this article is to clarify the concept of ‘civilizational populism’ and work towards a concise but operational definition. To do this, the article examines how populists across the world, and in a variety of different religious, geographic, and political contexts, incorporate and instrumentalize notions of ‘civilization’ into their discourses. The article observes that although a number of scholars have described a civilization turn among populists, there is currently no concrete definition of civilization populism, a concept which requires greater clarity. The article also observes that, while scholars have often found populists in Europe incorporating notions of civilization and ‘the clash of civilizations’ into the discourses, populists in non-Western environments also appear to have also incorporated notions of civilization into their discourses, yet these are rarely studied. The first part of the article begins by discussing the concept of ‘civilizationism’, a political discourse which emphasizes the civilizational aspect of social and especially national identity. Following this, the article discusses populism and describes how populism itself cannot succeed unless it adheres to a wider political programme or broader set of ideas, and without the engendering or exploiting of a ‘crisis’ which threatens ‘the people’. The article then examines the existing literature on the civilization turn evident among populists. The second part of the article builds on the previous section by discussing the relationship between civilizationism and populism worldwide. To do this, the paper examines civilizational populism in three key nations representing three of the world’s major faiths, and three different geographical regions: Turkey, India, and Myanmar. The paper makes three findings. First, while scholars have generally examined civilizational identity in European and North American right-wing populist rhetoric, we find it occurring in a wider range of geographies and religious contexts. Second, civilizationism when incorporated into populism gives content to the key signifiers: ‘the pure people’, ‘the corrupt elite’, and ‘dangerous ‘others’. In each case studied in this article, populists use a civilization based classification of peoples to draw boundaries around ‘the people’, ‘elites’ and ‘others’, and declare that ‘the people’ are ‘pure’ and ‘good’ because they belong to a civilization which is itself pure and good, and authentic insofar as they belong to the civilization which created the nation and culture which populists claim to be defending. Conversely, civilizational populists describe elites as having betrayed ‘the people’ by abandoning the religion and/or values and culture that shaped and were shaped by their civilization. Equally, civilizational populists describe religious minorities as ‘dangerous’ others who are morally bad insofar as they belong to a foreign civilization, and therefore to a different religion and/or culture with different values which are antithetical to those of ‘our’ civilization. Third, civilizational populist rhetoric is effective insofar as populists’ can, by adding a civilizational element to the vertical and horizontal dimensions of their populism, claim a civilizational crisis is occurring. Finally, based on the case studies, the paper defines civilizational populism as a group of ideas that together considers that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people, and society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ who collaborate with the dangerous others belonging to other civilizations that are hostile and present a clear and present danger to the civilization and way of life of the pure people.

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Trump and the Politics of International Religious Freedom

Cited by 16 publications

References 18 publications

COP and the Cloth: Quantitatively and Normatively Assessing Religious NGO Participation at the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

COP and the Cloth: Quantitatively and Normatively Assessing Religious NGO Participation at the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Understanding Hungary’s Support for Persecuted Christians: Scrutinising Religious Motives for Giving Aid

Civilizational Populism: Definition, Literature, Theory, and Practice

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