Tropes in space

Giberman, Daniel

doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0108-8

Cited by 26 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Substratum theorists sometimes argue that otherwise separable fundamental intrinsic properties are conjoined by virtue of inhering in one and the same substratum; moreover, it has been claimed that this explanatory utility constitutes a powerful argument in favor of the theory (see, for instance, LaBossiere , 364). By contrast, bundle theorists argue that their ontology can likewise account for such property linkage, whether by reference to compresence or colocation or mereological fusion or (as in Giberman ) containment by a master trope. The other two main substance ontologies are primitive substance theory and hylomorphism.…”

Section: Some Existing Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Natural-Kind Essentialism, Substance Ontology, and the Unity Problem: Two Dispositionalist Solutions

Dumsday

2016

Dialectica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What accounts for the linkage of seemingly diverse and inherently separable fundamental properties, such that they are regarded as properties of a single thing? Multiple answers to this question have been put forward in both the historical and current literature, especially from competing substance ontologies and competing theories concerning the metaphysics of natural kinds. Here I lay out and critically assess two ways in which dispositionalism might contribute to the discussion.

show abstract

Section: Some Existing Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Natural-Kind Essentialism, Substance Ontology, and the Unity Problem: Two Dispositionalist Solutions

Dumsday

2016

Dialectica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…First, in addition to being particular, tropes are categorially simple: either tropes are simple or all of their proper parts are tropes. 2 The advocates of standard trope nominalism include Williams (1953aWilliams ( , 1953b, Campbell (1981Campbell ( , 1990, Maurin (2002), Simons (2003), and Giberman (2014). Second, tropes themselves are considered countable individuals having certain identity conditions (individuality) and countability (being one) as their further category features.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…"by concentrating attention on some, but not all, of what is presented" (Campbell 1981, 477-478). 2 The advocates of standard trope nominalism include Williams (1953aWilliams ( , 1953b, Campbell (1981Campbell ( , 1990, Maurin (2002), Simons (2003), and Giberman (2014). By contrast, Ehring (2011) claims that the nature of a trope must be determined extrinsically, by its belonging to a primitive natural class.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…17 Of the recent trope theorists, both Ehring (2011) and Giberman (2014) offer an extensive discussion of quality tropes. 17 Of the recent trope theorists, both Ehring (2011) and Giberman (2014) offer an extensive discussion of quality tropes.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, also in Campbell's later account, the determinable kinds of tropes are presupposed rather than explained away on the pain of contradiction. 17 Of the recent trope theorists, both Ehring (2011) and Giberman (2014) offer an extensive discussion of quality tropes. Because Ehring is a natural kind trope nominalist, the present problem does not directly concern Ehring's views.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Kinds of Tropes without Kinds

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this article, we propose a new trope nominalist conception of determinate and determinable kinds of quantitative tropes. The conception is developed as follows. First, we formulate a new account of tropes falling under the same determinates and determinables in terms of internal relations of proportion and order. Our account is a considerable improvement on the current standard account because it does not rely on primitive internal relations of exact similarity or quantitative distance. The internal relations of proportion and order hold because the related tropes exist; no kinds of tropes need to be assumed here. Second, we argue that there are only pluralities of tropes in relations of proportion and order. The tropes mutually connected by the relations of proportion and order form a special type of plurality, tropes belonging to the same kind. Unlike the recent nominalist accounts, we do not identify kinds of tropes with any additional entities (e.g. sets) or abstractions from entities (e.g. pluralities of similar tropes).

show abstract