Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics

Abstract

I analyse the relationship between the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem: the former offers a solution for the latter only on the premise that killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is permissible. Here I offer both empirical and theoretical arguments against the permissibility of killing the one: firstly, I present data from my own empirical studies according to which the intuition that killing the one is permissible is neither widespread nor stable; secondly, I defend a normative principle according to which killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is not permissible. In conclusion, there just is no trolley problem.

Development of Cheating Dilemma as a Thought Experiment in Assessing the Student’s Ethical Decision Making

“…Even if the bad outcome was predicted, this is true. The Doctrine of Double Effect can be used to argue that the difference in moral permissibility in the trolley problem and its variants arises from the one being killed as a way of rescuing the five, but in Bystander at the Switch, the death of the one is only a side effect of saving the five (Di Nucci, 2014).…”