Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Multiparty Collaborative Supervision of Personal Information Security in App: Empirical Evidence From China

Guo, Yihang; Zou, Kai; Yang, Miaocheng; Liu, Chang

doi:10.1109/access.2022.3198705

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 31 publications

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“…In order to discuss the sensitivity of the parameters and verify the model's accuracy, we used MATLAB 2022b to simulate the dynamic evolutionary trajectory of the evolving system. Considering the research hypothesis of this paper, by drawing on [40,[43][44][45] and based on the evolutionary stability strategies (active governance, participation, and emergency response), the parameters of the diverse cases are set as follows: R � 9, C1 � 8, p � 0.4, C2 � 5, n � 4, f � 2, T � 20, C3 � 8, u3 � 4, e � 6. In the previous discussion, we have analyzed how the decision making of third-party platforms, local governments, and the central government is determined by factors such as R − C1, n + fp − C2, and Tp − C3 + pu3.…”

Section: Numerical Simulation and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Digital Security Governance under the Objectives of Digital Ecology: A Three-Party Evolutionary Game Approach

Tian,

Jiang,

Yue

2024

Complexity

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With the rapid development of the digital economy, there has been an explosion in the amount of data generated. Data have become a vital resource for nations, just as tangible assets and human capital are crucial factors of production. Consequently, protecting digital security has become paramount. However, the increasing frequency of various data security incidents in recent years has exposed issues such as inadequate platform governance, lack of government regulation, and incomplete digital security governance (DSG) mechanisms. This study aims to create a healthy and open digital ecosystem and proposes a new digital security governance framework. It subdivides traditional government departments into local governments and the central government. Together with third-party platforms, they are analyzed as participants in an evolutionary game. The study examines the evolutionary stability of strategy choices made by each party and explores the relationship between key factors such as negative externalities, data security incident probabilities, and their impacts on strategy selection using numerical simulations. The research findings indicate the following. (1) Key parameters such as implicit benefits, government subsidies, and negative externalities play a significantly positive role in the development of the digital ecosystem. (2) The central government consistently tends towards emergency response, considering the overall societal perspective, as long as it is capable of bearing the costs. (3) Local governments may exhibit free-riding behavior during the governance process. To address this, it is important to increase the willingness of third-party platforms to govern and oversee the participation of local governments, which is an effective way to prevent data crises. The study also identifies different governance models in various environments: (1) a digital security governance model in a stable market environment, involving increased central government intervention and supervision of local governments’ participation; and (2) a digital security governance model in the event of a data crisis, where the central government establishes subsidies that exceed the governance costs of local governments to enhance the willingness of third-party platforms to govern. Finally, recommendations and strategies are presented to enhance the level of digital security governance.

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Section: Numerical Simulation and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Digital Security Governance under the Objectives of Digital Ecology: A Three-Party Evolutionary Game Approach

Tian,

Jiang,

Yue

2024

Complexity

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Research on Data Security Governance Strategy Based on Trilateral Evolutionary Game

Zhen,

Jiang,

Yue

2023

Preprint

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An Inquiry into the Evolutionary Game among Tripartite Entities and Strategy Selection within the Framework of Personal Information Authorization

Tang,

Peng,

Wei

2024

BDCC

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Mobile applications (Apps) serve as vital conduits for information exchange in the mobile internet era, yet they also engender significant cybersecurity risks due to their real-time handling of vast quantities of data. This manuscript constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model, “users-App providers-government”, to illuminate a pragmatic pathway for orderly information circulation within the App marketplace and sustainable industry development. It then scrutinizes the evolutionary process and emergence conditions of their stabilizing equilibrium strategies and employs simulation analysis via MATLAB. The findings reveal that (1) there exists a high degree of coupling among the strategic selections of the three parties, wherein any alteration in one actor’s decision-making trajectory exerts an impact on the evolutionary course of the remaining two actors. (2) The initial strategies significantly influence the pace of evolutionary progression and its outcome. Broadly speaking, the higher the initial probabilities of users opting for information authorization, App providers adopting compliant data solicitation practices, and the government enforcing stringent oversight, the more facile the attainment of an evolutionarily optimal solution. (3) The strategic preferences of the triadic stakeholders are subject to a composite influence of respective costs, benefits, and losses. Of these, users’ perceived benefits serve as the impetus for their strategic decisions, while privacy concerns act as a deterrent. App providers’ strategy decisions are influenced by a number of important elements, including their corporate reputation and fines levied by the government. Costs associated with government regulations are the main barrier to the adoption of strict supervision practices. Drawing upon these analytical outcomes, we posit several feasible strategies.

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Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Multiparty Collaborative Supervision of Personal Information Security in App: Empirical Evidence From China

Cited by 3 publications

References 31 publications

Analysis of Digital Security Governance under the Objectives of Digital Ecology: A Three-Party Evolutionary Game Approach

Analysis of Digital Security Governance under the Objectives of Digital Ecology: A Three-Party Evolutionary Game Approach

Research on Data Security Governance Strategy Based on Trilateral Evolutionary Game

An Inquiry into the Evolutionary Game among Tripartite Entities and Strategy Selection within the Framework of Personal Information Authorization

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