Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies

Xu, Zhiqi; Cheng, Yukun; Yao, Shuntian

doi:10.1155/2021/6693597

Cited by 33 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The vertical emergency game between the upper and lower governments [34]; the horizontal emergency game in crossregional government [35]; the game relationship between government, enterprises, and the public [36]; and the emergency cooperation game between the government and non-profit organizations [37] are important directions of the emergency cooperation game at the present stage. In addition, evolutionary game theory has made some progress in public health events [38], safety accidents [39], natural disasters [40], and other emergencies.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

Liu

Song

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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To reveal the interaction and influence mechanism between emergency rescue entities, and to explore and optimize a cooperation mechanism of emergency rescue entities, a tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency rescue cooperation based on government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions was constructed. The stability of each game subject’s strategy choice was explored. Simulation analysis was applied to investigate the influence mechanism of key parameters on the evolution of the game subject’s strategy combination. The research results show that government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions have consistent political demands and rescue targets in emergency rescue cooperation. The game subjects are driving forces for each other to choose positive strategies. The game evolution process of the emergency cooperation model shows a “mobilization-coordination” feature. At the same time, the emergency capital stock formed based on trust relationships, information matching, and institutional norms between game subjects can promote the evolution of the game system toward (1,1,1). In addition, for government organizations with limited emergency resources, the average allocation of emergency resources is not the optimal solution for emergency rescue efficiency. However, it is easier to achieve the overall target of emergency rescue cooperation by investing limited emergency resources in key variables that match the on-site situation. On this basis, combined with the practice of emergency rescues in emergencies, countermeasures and solutions are proposed to optimize the mechanism and improve the efficiency of emergency rescue cooperation.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

Liu

Song

et al. 2022

IJERPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Similarly, An et al studied innovative behavior between financial and regulatory institutions [21]. Taking the COVID-19 pandemic as an example, Xu et al constructed an evolutionary game model of different parties to describe their decision-making behavior relating to epidemic prevention and control after the occurrence of public health emergencies [22]. Ji et al also used evolutionary game theory to investigate the behavior and choices of local governments and automakers relating to new energy vehicle subsidy policies [23].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Dissemination of False Information by Multiple Parties after Major Emergencies

Sun

et al. 2022

Complexity

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False information is always produced after the outbreak of major emergencies. Taking this into consideration, this paper discusses the behavior of multiple parties in relation to false information dissemination after major emergencies. First, a game model is constructed, using relevant knowledge of evolutionary game theory, between three parties: regulatory institutions, opinion leaders, and ordinary Internet users. Second, the model equations are solved, and the evolutionary stability strategies of each game party under different circumstances are analyzed. Third, a numerical simulation is applied to the evolutionary trends under different strategy combinations with varying parameters. The results show that the probability of each game party making ideal decisions is positively correlated with the degree of punishment imposed by regulatory institutions on opinion leaders who release false information, the reward provided by regulatory institutions on opinion leaders who release positive information, the degree of participation and satisfaction gained by Internet users in adopting positive information, the richness of authentic content released by opinion leaders, and the psychological identification of Internet users with opinion leaders. Meanwhile, the probability of each game party making ideal decisions is negatively correlated with investigation and evidence collection costs borne by opinion leaders who release positive information, the additional income for opinion leaders who have false information adopted by Internet users, the costs of Internet users’ time and energy when they adopt information released by opinion leaders, and the costs of independently judging the accuracy of information by Internet users.

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“…In this study, we draw on evolutionary game theory in order to describe the interactions between emergency organizations in the cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters. In recent years, evolutionary game theory has also been applied and developed in emergency management problems [ 47 , 48 ], such as the prevention and control of public health emergencies [ 49 , 50 ], government safety supervision [ 51 ], guiding emergency mass evacuation [ 52 ], government emergency mobilization [ 53 ], and emergency handling strategies of engineering construction [ 54 ]. The dynamic decision-making mechanism of different emergency organizations has been examined based on the strategy types and evolution process of participants in emergency management.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

Liu

Guo

et al. 2021

IJERPH

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Natural disasters have obvious cross-regional and compound characteristics. Cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters deepens the diversification of coordination relations and the complexity of interaction modes among emergency response organizations, including horizontal and vertical organizational interactions. In order to clarify the cooperation mechanism of emergency organizations during cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters and to explore the key factors that affect the cooperative relationships of emergency organizations, in this study, a game model is constructed based on evolutionary game theory, which is composed of local, neighboring, and central governments. Then, the stability of the emergency game strategy is analyzed. On this basis, a numerical simulation is used to simulate the dynamic evolution trajectory of the game system. The results show that there is an embedded mutual promotion mechanism that evolves towards a positive emergency strategy combination among the game subjects. The selection strategies of the game subjects show the characteristics of consistency and the following: enhanced cooperation efficiency between local and neighboring governments, emergency capital stock, and shared resources, therefore, guiding social emergency forces to actively participate in emergency operations. Strengthening the emergency dispatching strength of the central government and the effectiveness of central–local emergency dispatching, can support the performance of cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters. Furthermore, the efficiency of cooperation between local and neighboring governments will be enhanced.

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Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies

Cited by 33 publications

References 15 publications

How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Dissemination of False Information by Multiple Parties after Major Emergencies

A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

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