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2016
DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2016.1178737
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Trick and treat: how the Commission and the European Parliament exert influence in EU foreign and security policies*

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Cited by 33 publications
(21 citation statements)
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References 29 publications
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“…The second type, bargaining influence, suggests that supranational actors draw on their institutional bargaining power to make sure that policy initiatives at the security-development interface increase their own competences. While the Commission may offer or threaten to withhold important implementing capacities for CFSP/ CSDP initiatives (such as the external financing instruments legally rooted in development policy), both the Commission and the EP could potentially block or delay EU policies, for example, by conferring matters to the EU Court of Justice (Blauberger and Weiss 2013;Riddervold and Rosén 2016).…”
Section: Cultivated Spillovermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The second type, bargaining influence, suggests that supranational actors draw on their institutional bargaining power to make sure that policy initiatives at the security-development interface increase their own competences. While the Commission may offer or threaten to withhold important implementing capacities for CFSP/ CSDP initiatives (such as the external financing instruments legally rooted in development policy), both the Commission and the EP could potentially block or delay EU policies, for example, by conferring matters to the EU Court of Justice (Blauberger and Weiss 2013;Riddervold and Rosén 2016).…”
Section: Cultivated Spillovermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For some, this new convention implies that 'Parliament now decides when Britain goes to war' (Strong, 2015b) although its exact shape remains contested (Mello, 2017a). 4 Moreover, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have proven especially skilled in eliciting additional powers as the European Parliament (EP) has gained most of its competences (not only in the security realm) by stubbornly insisting that it is entitled to them and by making strategic use of its position in the policy process continuously to expand its own role (Riddervold and Rosén, 2016). However, where parliamentarians lack the will or ability to assert their preferences or make their voices heard, even strong constitutional powers will not lead to parliamentary involvement and influence.…”
Section: Informal Sources Of Parliamentary Influence On Governmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…During the implementation and evaluation stages, MPs may scrutinise implementation, 'name and shame' shortcomings, and frame the lessons learned from current and previous policies, thereby putting pressure on future decisions. MPs can also gain influence by circumventing the executive and working directly with other actors, for instance through parliamentary diplomacy (Stavridis and Jančić 2016), or by presenting arguments that are considered legitimate and valid by executive actors (Riddervold and Rosén 2016).…”
Section: Parliamentary Means and Motives For Challenging Foreign Policymentioning
confidence: 99%