2006
DOI: 10.1093/socrel/67.1.61
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Trends in Religious Stratification: Have Religious Group Socioeconomic Distinctions Declined in Recent Decades?

Abstract: This study examines the degree to which reli^ous group socioeconomic differences have declined during the period from 1972-2000. There has been some debate in the literature regarding the blurring of religious group socioeconomic distinctions, and this paper will outline the conflicting positions on this issue. An analysis of national survey data reveals some improvement in the relative socioeconomic positioning of Black and Conservative Protestants from the 1970s through the 1990s. However, Liberal Protestant… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
42
0
1

Year Published

2008
2008
2018
2018

Publication Types

Select...
7
1

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 64 publications
(45 citation statements)
references
References 35 publications
2
42
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…8 This failure to investigate how religion and class interact seems to stem from one very influential study's insistence that greater religious vitality was not connected to conservative Christians' lower class status overall (Smith 1998). Whereas it is true that conservative Christians have made status gains relative to mainline Protestants in the past three decades (Park & Reimer 2002, Pyle 2006, Schwadel 2014, being just as likely to graduate from high school as their mainline counterparts, evangelicals continue to lag in rates of higher education (Massengill 2008), even if they switch to another denomination (Glass et al 2015). In fact, although it seems not to have become part of the accepted wisdom within the sociology of religion [perhaps because of studies, such as Lindsay's (2007), which focus on evangelical elites], an overwhelming amount of research demonstrates that, overall, white conservative Protestants are at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder (Beyerlein 2004;Darnell & Sherkat 1997;Davidson & Pyle 2011;Davis & Robinson 1996a;Greeley & Hout 2006;Guth & Green 1990;Keister 2003;Keister 2011;Lehrer 2009;McConkey 2001;Sherkat 2010Sherkat , 2011Sherkat , 2012Smith & Faris 2005;Wald & Calhoun-Brown 2011;Woodrum 1988).…”
Section: Where the Consensus Ends And What The Consensus Might Be Obsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…8 This failure to investigate how religion and class interact seems to stem from one very influential study's insistence that greater religious vitality was not connected to conservative Christians' lower class status overall (Smith 1998). Whereas it is true that conservative Christians have made status gains relative to mainline Protestants in the past three decades (Park & Reimer 2002, Pyle 2006, Schwadel 2014, being just as likely to graduate from high school as their mainline counterparts, evangelicals continue to lag in rates of higher education (Massengill 2008), even if they switch to another denomination (Glass et al 2015). In fact, although it seems not to have become part of the accepted wisdom within the sociology of religion [perhaps because of studies, such as Lindsay's (2007), which focus on evangelical elites], an overwhelming amount of research demonstrates that, overall, white conservative Protestants are at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder (Beyerlein 2004;Darnell & Sherkat 1997;Davidson & Pyle 2011;Davis & Robinson 1996a;Greeley & Hout 2006;Guth & Green 1990;Keister 2003;Keister 2011;Lehrer 2009;McConkey 2001;Sherkat 2010Sherkat , 2011Sherkat , 2012Smith & Faris 2005;Wald & Calhoun-Brown 2011;Woodrum 1988).…”
Section: Where the Consensus Ends And What The Consensus Might Be Obsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Evangelical Protestants receive more bonding capital through church than do affiliates of other Christian traditions, especially Catholics (Ellison, Krause et al 2009). The church-based social interactions among evangelical Protestants, however, may produce a very limited form of social capital because evangelical Protestants are less educated, have fewer verbal skills, and have lower incomes than do Catholics and mainline Protestants (Keister 2008;Pyle 2006;Sherkat 2010). Their churches also have less class and race diversity (Dougherty 2003;Schwadel 2009).…”
Section: Religious Traditionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To the extent that white evangelical Protestants differ from whites in other religious traditions on these socio-demographic characteristics, they may be distinctive in their neighborhood racial preferences. Notable differences in socioeconomic status and educational attainment continue to exist between religious groups in the United States [60,61]. Individuals that grow up in evangelical denominations continue to attain lower levels of education than other whites, resulting in somewhat lower levels of education among white evangelicals as a whole [61].…”
Section: Socio-demographic Characteristicsmentioning
confidence: 99%