Trends and Issues in Development Aid

Kharas, Homi

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1080342

Cited by 79 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…We thus expected public support to decrease with rising recipient country income relative to donor country income. This expectation would also be consistent with OECD countries' scaling back of official development assistance to large emerging economies during the past decade (Kharas, 2007).…”

Section: Theory: Design Elements Influencing Climate Funding Supportsupporting

confidence: 74%

Obtaining public support for North-South climate funding: Evidence from conjoint experiments in donor countries

Gampfer

Bernauer

Kachi

2014

Global Environmental Change

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Section: Theory: Design Elements Influencing Climate Funding Supportsupporting

confidence: 74%

Obtaining public support for North-South climate funding: Evidence from conjoint experiments in donor countries

Gampfer

Bernauer

Kachi

2014

Global Environmental Change

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“…revenues, with coefficients of variation in the range of 40-60% of mean aid flows. Both studies also found that aid volatility has actually increased since the late 1990s, as do the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office (2007) with respect to aid to Sub-Saharan Africa and Kharas (2007) for a larger group of aid recipients.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Aid volatility and poverty traps

Agénor

Aizenman

2010

Journal of Development Economics

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a b s t r a c tThis paper studies the impact of aid volatility in a two-period model where production may occur with either a traditional or a modern technology. Public spending is productive and "time to build" requires expenditure in both periods for the modern technology to be used. The possibility of a poverty trap induced by high aid volatility is first examined in a benchmark case where taxation is absent. The analysis is then extended to account for self insurance (taking the form of a first-period contingency fund) financed through taxation. An increase in aid volatility is shown to raise the optimal contingency fund. But if future aid also depends on the size of the contingency fund (as a result of a moral hazard effect on donors' behavior), the optimal policy may entail no self insurance.

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“…34. The amount going as debt relief, though it could free resources for investment, tends to inflate the amount of aid as it includes interest charges and penalties which are arbitrary and often excessive (Kharas 2007). 35.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multilateral Development Cooperation in a Changing Global Order

Besada¹,

Kindornay²

2013

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Trends and Issues in Development Aid

Cited by 79 publications

References 6 publications

Obtaining public support for North-South climate funding: Evidence from conjoint experiments in donor countries

Obtaining public support for North-South climate funding: Evidence from conjoint experiments in donor countries

Aid volatility and poverty traps

Multilateral Development Cooperation in a Changing Global Order

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