Tree‐Huggers Versus Human‐Lovers: Anthropomorphism and Dehumanization Predict Valuing Nature Over Outgroups

Abstract

Previous examinations of the scope of moral concern have focused on aggregate attributions of moral worth. However, because trade‐offs exist in valuing different kinds of entities, tabulating total amounts of moral expansiveness may conceal significant individual differences in the relative proportions of moral valuation ascribed to various entities. We hypothesized that some individuals (“tree‐huggers”) would ascribe greater moral worth to animals and ecosystems than to humans from marginalized or stigmatized groups, while others (“human‐lovers”) would ascribe greater moral worth to outgroup members than to the natural world. Additionally, because moral valuation is often treated as being zero‐sum, we hypothesized that there would be no difference in aggregate levels of moral concern between tree‐huggers and human‐lovers. Finally, because attributions of mental capacities substantially contribute to moral valuation, we predicted that tree‐huggers and human‐lovers would show different patterns of mind attribution for animals versus humans. Three studies (N = 985) yielded evidence in support of our hypotheses. First, over one‐third of participants valued nature over outgroups. Second, extending moral value to animals and nature was not indicative of more expansive moral concern overall; instead, tree‐huggers and human‐lovers were identical in their aggregate ascriptions of moral worth. Third, tree‐huggers had relatively amplified tendencies to attribute mental capacities to animals and relatively reduced tendencies to attribute mental capacities to outgroup members—thus having elevated rates of both anthropomorphism and dehumanization. These findings necessitate a reconceptualization of both the extension of moral worth and the attribution of minds.

Challenging the Neo-Anthropocentric Relational Approach to Robot Rights

“…Environmental ethics is, after all, at times understood as the examination of how moral thinking and action can be expanded both beyond humans and beyond the present (Nolt, 2014). Just as the robot rights movement is often perceived as a form of unwarranted and misdirected activism (Birhane and Van Dijk, 2020a;Birhane and Van Dijk, 2020b), the same often goes for environmental ethicists, at times labeled "treehuggers," antihumanists or misanthropes who fight for the rights of animals and the natural world at the expense of human beings (Drengson, 1995;Kopnina et al, 2018;Rottman et al, 2021). Such a denouncement is, however, based on the erroneous notion that there is a "hierarchy of ethics" and that all research should be directed to whichever problems the critics consider to be more important than considering robot-or environmental-rights (Saetra and Fosch-Villaronga, 2021).…”

How much could your heart embrace? What about your behavior? The Socio‐moral Radar as a behavioral expression of moral regard

“…Graham and his colleagues (Graham et al, 2017) focus on centrifugal and centripetal forces in the moral circle, and a more recent research has studied how the compassion feelings can enlarge the scope of individuals' moral concerns and the fear of compassion does the opposite (Rottman et al, 2021).…”

“…It recognizes varying levels of moral concern that may range from strong moral obligations, to some acknowledgement of moral rights, or to no recognition at all (Crimston et al, 2016). Moral expansiveness represents an individual trait that may be modified by motivation, situational factors, and the attributions of the targets, which highlights the fluid nature of our moral boundaries (Crimston et al, 2018;Rottman et al, 2021). The concepts reviewed above show a variety of approaches to what can be defined as "moral circle" studies.…”

“…Thus, Graham et al (2017) describe that: Moral circles can be thought of as a series of increasingly large concentric circles, with the self in the center, surrounded by immediate family, extended family, friends, local community, nation, world area, all humans, all mammals, all animals, all living things on Earth, all living things in the universe, and finally all things including inanimate matter. (p. 4) However, this graphical metaphor may be imprecise and the scope of moral concern may not invariantly be characterized as consisting of accretions of concentric rings following some universal order (e.g., Opotow, 1993;Rottman et al, 2021). In this sense, the exact content of the entities included as targets of regard, care, and obligation to protect may vary from one individual to another creating differences in the shape of the limits of their moral concern.…”

“…In this sense, the exact content of the entities included as targets of regard, care, and obligation to protect may vary from one individual to another creating differences in the shape of the limits of their moral concern. A recent study (Rottman et al, 2021) has evidenced that at least two different "profiles" can be differentiated distinguishing between individuals who allocate greater moral value to human out-groups at the detriment of animal and nature entities and those who morally prioritize animals and the natural world above human outgroup members. The study has also shown that, defying the notion of universally organized moral circles, there has been no difference in aggregate overall levels of moral concern between the two profiles.…”