Treble Damages and the Incentive to Sue and Settle

Briggs, Hugh C.; Huryn, Kathleen D.; McBride, Mark E.

doi:10.2307/2555881

Cited by 33 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Modelling legal pluralism in this manner is closely aligned with Moore's (1973) conception of the phenomenon as semi-autonomous social fields interacting with one another. McAfee, Mialon, and Mialon (2008) have considered the importance of sequencing in relation to these interactions while Briggs, Huryn, and Mc Bride (1996) and Coffee (1986) have also considered the aggregation of public and private enforcement efforts and jointly determined level of deterrence. Licht (2008) has also considered interactions between the state and groups of norms.…”

Section: S Larcommentioning

confidence: 99%

Problematic legal pluralism: causes and some potential ‘cures’

Larcom

2014

The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law

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The tools of analytical positivism and economic analysis are applied to the phenomenon of legal pluralism. An analytical framework is developed to ascertain when legal pluralism is problematic in the control of wrongdoing. It is demonstrated that there are three specific cases: rivalrous compliance, sanctions for wrong behaviour that are deemed to be wrongs themselves, and the uncoordinated sanctioning of common wrongs. Then there is a discussion of the consequences and some approaches that can be used to ameliorate each case that has been identified. It is hoped that this framework will be used to guide future practical and theoretical discussions on legal pluralism and its potential problems.

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Section: S Larcommentioning

confidence: 99%

Problematic legal pluralism: causes and some potential ‘cures’

Larcom

2014

The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law

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“…In practice, most litigation expenses involve discovery and experts, and are incurred prior to a trial. 3 For example, an expert devotes most of his or her time to a review of case materials, report preparation and pre-trial deposition. These discovery and expert costs far outweigh the trial costs that can be avoided by a settlement.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trial Incentives in Sequential Litigation

Bernhardt

Lee

2014

American Law and Economics Review

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We analyze when and why trials can emerge in equilibrium when a defendant may sequentially face multiple plaintiffs. Subsequent potential plaintiffs learn about their chances of winning from the initial trial outcome. An initial trial serves as an experiment that the defendant can run to induce plaintiffs' learning. The initial case may go to trial when a favorable trial outcome for the defense can deter potential future plaintiffs from filing lawsuits. Possible future meritless lawsuits further raise the attraction of an initial trial. We show how outcomes are affected if the initial plaintiff's attorney may represent future clients, and hence also values learning, and derive the impact of the plaintiff's bargaining power.

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“…Harrington (2004) considers the dynamic pricing behavior of cartels when competition authorities or others use price changes as an important signal to detect the presence of collusion. And Briggs et al (1996) analyses the effects of private damages follow-8 Gallo et al (2000, pp. 112-119).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imperfect competition law enforcement

Schinkel

Tuinstra

2006

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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Competition policy is a subject of often heated debate. Competition authorities, seeking to prevent or battle anticompetitive acts in complex cases to the best of their abilities, regularly find themselves advised by rival economic theories and disputed empirical analyses. As a consequence, there is a real possibility that they may occasionally err, missing true violations of competition law or finding firms liable that actually had no other intentions than good competition. In this paper, possible consequences of such imperfect competition law enforcement on firm strategies are considered. In a simple model of collusion, it is found that the incidence of anti-competitive behavior increases in both types of enforcement errors: Type II errors decrease expected fines, while Type I errors encourage industries to collude precautionary when they face the risk of a false conviction. Hence, fallible antitrust enforcement may stifle genuine competition, thus stimulating the very behavior competition policy is meant to deter. When enforcement errors are nonnegligible, competition authorities run the risk of being over-zealous, in the sense that welfare is best served by an authority that is selective and conscientious in its targeting of alleged anticompetitive acts.

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Treble Damages and the Incentive to Sue and Settle

Cited by 33 publications

References 13 publications

Problematic legal pluralism: causes and some potential ‘cures’

Problematic legal pluralism: causes and some potential ‘cures’

Trial Incentives in Sequential Litigation

Imperfect competition law enforcement

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