Treasures status monitoring based on dynamic link-sensing

Tong, Xing; Xie, Bo; Xian, Tong; Heng, Yizhi; Liu, Chen; Xia, Zheng; Fang, Dingyi

doi:10.1007/s12083-016-0508-6

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(2) the Node Selects Cooperation (I) In The Traditional Ince1

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2018

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“…The platform checks whether the task has reached the settlement stage (1) for ∈ do (2) Platform settles the task and issue a response command (3) for every node ∈ userlist = { | = } do (4) if it doesn't response in time do (5) punish the node (6) else do (7) finish this assignment (8) end if (7) end for (8) Platform process the data and feed back (9) end for Algorithm 3: The settlement.…”

Section: (2) the Node Selects Cooperation (I) In The Traditional Incementioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Behavioral Economics in Crowdsensing: A Loss Aversion Cooperation Model

Deng

Qiu

Liu

et al. 2018

Scientific Programming

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The existing incentive mechanisms of crowdsourcing construct the expected utility function based on the assumption of rational people in traditional economics. A large number of studies in behavioral economics have demonstrated the defects of the traditional utility function and introduced a new parameter called loss aversion coefficient to calculate individual utility when it suffers a loss. In this paper, combination of behavioral economics and a payment algorithm based on the loss aversion is proposed. Compared with usual incentive mechanisms, the node utility function is redefined by the loss aversion characteristic of the node. Experimental results show that the proposed algorithm can get a higher rate of cooperation with a lower payment price and has good scalability compared with the traditional incentive mechanism.

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