Trawl fisheries, catch shares and the protection of benthic marine ecosystems: Has ownership generated incentives for seafloor stewardship?

Advancing marine biodiversity protection through regional fisheries management: A review of bottom fisheries closures in areas beyond national jurisdiction

“…Bottom trawling is generally considered to be the most destructive method as it involves dragging heavy fishing gear across the seabed, but harm can result from all bottom-contact fishing methods [17,23]. While fishing depths vary depending on the fishery in question, fishing is currently not technologically feasible at depths greater than 2000 m, with the majority of fishing taking place at depths of less than 1500 m, and most commonly at less than 1000 m [38].…”

“…In 2005, the GFCM prohibited the use of towed dredges and trawlnets fisheries at depths beyond 1000 m, 38 the first such ban to be implemented. This prohibition incorporates over half of the Mediterranean, and was a pre-emptive measure as most fishing up to that point had been in shallow waters.…”

“…One global study has noted the pitfalls of allowing users to selfregulate in a similar context, that of conservation measures implemented by fishing quota owners, stating that under-protection is common and that, "the protection of both benthic ecosystems and essential fish habitat (EFH) are marginal at best when quota owners have primacy in determining the boundaries of bottom trawl closures" [38].…”

“…RFMO/As have at times not closed areas where there is strong evidence of the presence of VMEs, implemented temporary closures when permanent closures are needed, and closed only representative areas. Often closures cover depths that are considered unfishable in any case [19,38], or do not cover relevant seamounts and other structures. When identifying VMEs, the focus has generally been on corals and sponges, rather on the wide range of other species and habitats that would fit the criteria in the FAO Guidelines [3].…”

The role of moral economy in two British Columbia fisheries: Confronting neoliberal policies

“…In New Zealand after ITQs were introduced, and more and more fishermen were lessees rather than owners of quota, "their higher financial stress increases compliance risk and their lack of investment in quota assets reduces incentives for stewardship of the resource" [96]. The regulations which ITQs were intended to replace usually have to be added back in some form [106][107][108][109][110], indicating that they do not adequately produce conservation on their own.…”