Transplant thought-experiments: two costly mistakes in discounting them

Abstract

Transplant' thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some form of psychological continuity theory of identity, arguments from Marya Schechtman and Kathleen Wilkes have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support is due to a lack of detail in their description or a reliance on predictions that we are in no position to make. I argue that the case against them rests on two serious misunderstandings of the operation of thought-experiments, and that even if they do not ultimately support a psychological continuity theory, they do major damage to that theory's opponents.Section 1: The Transplant 'Transplant' thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Although they are different from the traditional 'body-swap' thought-experiments like the one with which Locke started the modern debate in that they envisage the part of the brain that supports distinctive psychology being transferred rather than just the psychology itself, they have usually been used in a similar role. That is, they are presented as offering confirmation to some form of psychological continuity theory of identity (PCT) which holds your continued existence as the person you are to be a matter of the persistence of your distinctive psychology, 1 rather than the persistence of the organism that is your body. But recent arguments have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support founders due to a lack of detail in their description, or a reliance on predictions that we are in no position to make. I wish to argue that the case against them is unsuccessful and even if they do not ultimately support a PCT, they stand to do major damage to that theory's opponents.

Reconsidering a transplant: A response to Wagner

“…Nils-Frederic Wagner (2016) 1 takes issue with my argument (Beck 2014) that influential critics of 'transplant' thought experiments make two cardinal mistakes. He responds that the mistakes I identify are not mistakes at all.…”

Thought Experiments and Personal Identity in Africa

“…The fourth and final reason for continuing the discussion is that there are grounds—from both within and outside of African philosophy—for being dissatisfied with the criticisms of the method of thought experiment described above. We discuss some of these below; others can be found in Beck (2014, 2016).…”

The Extreme Claim, Psychological Continuity and the Person Life View

“…88 And she acknowledges that there can be two different back stories-one in which the cerebrum recipient takes up the original person life, and one in which the individual in a vegetative state is not just treated as a husk of the original, but is subject to many more person-related concerns in the way in which a patient in the late stages of dementia might be treated (and who, according to the PLV on cases of dementia is a forensic unit, continuing a person-life). We could push this further (as in Beck 2014) and have only the vegetative state individual as subject to person-related concerns while the cerebrum recipient is socially rejected from continuing the person-life. Schechtman (2014: p. 156ff) discusses what to say about the first two versions, and accepts that there is an element of conventionalism in what the PLV must say.…”