Transparency: from Bentham’s inventory of virtuous effects to contemporary evidence-based scepticism

Baume, Sandrine; Papadopoulos, Yannis

doi:10.1080/13698230.2015.1092656

Cited by 18 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…According to Schnackenberg and Tomlinson, this information provision has three dimensions: information disclosure, clarity and accuracy (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson, 2016). Baume and Papadopoulos claim that such transparency contributes to the quality of deliberation, since in the presence of the public in order to avoid losing credibility one must justify their conduct and cannot simply invoke selfish benefits (Baume & Papadopoulos, 2018;Elster, 2000). Naurin claims that transparency should be supplemented with publicity, which means that the content of the information should not merely be available but also actually reach the public and become known (Naurin, 2006).…”

Section: Deliberation In Support Of Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Morality of Lobbying for Tax Benefits: A Kantian Perspective

Vijver

2021

J Bus Ethics

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Multinationals' aggressive tax lobbying that involves free-riding behaviour and results in disproportional benefits to the disadvantage of other taxpayers, is problematic for several reasons. Such lobbying undermines the legitimacy of tax legislation and has a negative impact on trust in the tax system. Based on Immanuel Kant's ethical theory, this article first suggests a new normative basis for a moral duty that requires multinationals and their leaders to be transparent about their political activities and tax lobbying. Next, it introduces a new concept of transparency in respect of tax lobbying. 'Deliberative transparency' requires multinationals and their leaders not only to be open about their reasons for tax lobbying, but also to deliberate with stakeholders and, maybe even more importantly, to provide evidence supporting their lobbying positions. Finally, based on these new understandings, additional government interventions against aggressive tax lobbying are suggested, for example mandatory stakeholder consultation, reporting on stakeholder attitudes and perception, and evidencebased lobbying requirements.

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Section: Deliberation In Support Of Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Morality of Lobbying for Tax Benefits: A Kantian Perspective

Vijver

2021

J Bus Ethics

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“…While the quest for transparency emerged in political discourse in the late eighteenth century, the current widespread use of transparency is linked to, and grounded in, an economics literature (as part of agency theory and a game-theoretic logic) that is concerned with lowering transaction costs, improving market information and increasing organisational efficiency (Albu and Flyverbom, 2019;Baume and Papadopoulos, 2018). Schnackenberg and Tomlinson (2016) observed that transparency is often invoked as a balm for corporate malfeasance through its presumed ability to restore stakeholder trust in the firm and in the financial market system.…”

Section: Transparency In Principles and Codes Of "Good" Governance Pr...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The moral problem emerges when corporations are motivated only to fit the expected social norms of disclosure that treat transparency as a way of endeavouring to increase systemic trust by meeting minimal standards set by laws and rules. Baume and Papadopoulos (2018) argue that the causal relationship between transparency and moralisation should not be posited in overly mechanistic terms: transparency is not a sufficient condition for moralisation which necessitates other prerequisites. In this way, corporate decisions and actions simply are legitimated rather than scrutinized (Christensen and Cornelissen, 2015).…”

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confidence: 94%

“…It is assumed that being morally good by being transparent correlates with being trustworthy (Schnackenberg and Tomlinson, 2016). Baume and Papadopoulos (2018) counter this widely held view, stating that while there is growing enthusiasm for transparency in public affairs and discourses idealising its value, and it is part of the rhetoric used by advocates of "good governance", there is little justification for this fervour. The view that transparency underpins legitimacy and that it has virtuous effects is qualified by criticisms in scholarly work which emphasise the possible costs and perverse effects of the search for transparency, or that it may fail to deliver the expected benefits.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Transparency Is (Full) Disclosure in Corporate Governance

Janning¹,

Khlif²,

Ingley

2020

The Illusion of Transparency in Corporate Governance

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Corporate disclosure and reporting of information has become synonymous with transparency which in discourses idealising its value is part of the rhetoric of good governance. This notion is overtly conveyed in principles and codes of corporate governance practice which have proliferated globally over the last three decades. The possibility for transparency to conceal more than is revealed is considered with regard to corporate communication of information, with the consequence that power and real knowledge of the corporate behavioural agenda remains in corporate hands. Philosophically, the paradoxical and unintended outcome is that corporations are constrained by the norm of transparency in developing authentic moral behaviour, while also exercising power and control since in the information society transparency does not, and indeed cannot, lead to revealing all. Transparency places greater emphasis on judging, or evaluating existing organisational processes than on assessment of (self-)learning processes based on what actually takes place when corporations make decisions.

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“… 4 For that reason, it strikes me as misleading to attribute to Bentham “belief in a straightforward positive correlation between transparency, trust, acceptance and legitimacy” (Baume and Papadopoulos 2015, 12). …”

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confidence: 99%

Vigilance and Confidence: Jeremy Bentham, Publicity, and the Dialectic of Political Trust and Distrust

Bruno

2017

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Distrust of public authorities is a mainstay of democratic politics. In recent decades, however, concern with surging civic suspicion has led political scientists to emphasize the value of trust for good government. This article advances a novel reading of Jeremy Bentham's political theory to shed light on the promise and perils of these two dispositions. Trust and distrust go together, in Bentham's account. In making this case, I reexamine Bentham's reflections on publicity, and distinguish between two perspectives implicit in his theory—the perspective of institutional design, and the perspective of popular oversight. This distinction brings clarity to Bentham's surprising recommendation: sober distrust toward public authorities generally, together with particularized trust in those (and only those) institutions or officials who prove themselves worthy of it.

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Transparency: from Bentham’s inventory of virtuous effects to contemporary evidence-based scepticism

Cited by 18 publications

References 47 publications

Morality of Lobbying for Tax Benefits: A Kantian Perspective

Morality of Lobbying for Tax Benefits: A Kantian Perspective

Transparency Is (Full) Disclosure in Corporate Governance

Vigilance and Confidence: Jeremy Bentham, Publicity, and the Dialectic of Political Trust and Distrust

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