Transparency and imagining seeing

Abstract

In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a wellknown -though not always equally well understood -argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin's complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin's argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of disjunctivism; and (iv) to argue that there is a related reason to prefer experiential intentionalism over Martin's version of disjunctivism.

Experience and Introspection

“…I have no room here to properly discuss and evaluate the arguments in favor of experiential disjunctivism. But one of its advantages is that it can preserve well our ordinary conception of perceptions, according to which it is part of their nature that they bring us into contact with the external world, that is, genuinely relate us in a distinctive manner to mind-independent objects or facts ( Martin, 2002;Dorsch, 2010b ). By contrast, other prominent views about the nature of perceptual experiences have to adopt an error theory concerning some aspect or another of our ordinary opinions about perceptions.…”

“…Many of the central elements of experiential disjunctivism have been well argued for (see, e.g., Martin, 2000aMartin, , 2002Nudds, this volume;Dorsch, 2010b ). Notably, the following three insights should not be readily given up: (i) perceptions, but not hallucinations, are essentially relational; (ii) the relationality of perceptions is accessible in introspection; and (iii) perception-like hallucinations may differ in their natures from each other and need not have more than their subjective indiscriminability from perceptions in common.…”

The Diversity of Disjunctivism Fabian Dorsch: (Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge edited by Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock)

“…But it might be worthwhile to consider alternative forms of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences which, for instance, allow for (partial) identity in phenomenal or functional kind (cf. Dorsch 2010, 2011).…”

“…What renders the resulting metaphysical disjunctivism about the rational role of experiences particularly interesting is that it is compatible with the idea that perceptions and hallucinations still share their phenomenal character and functional role (cf. Dorsch 2010, 2011). Moreover, disjunctivism about reasons for action—or, indeed, good actions 5 —may be integrated in a very similar way: having reason to act—or acting in a good way—is constitutively dependent on external facts.…”

“… 2 See Dorsch (2010, 2011) for a defence of such a view. There, I also spell out why I prefer to use the label ‘experiential disjunctivism’ to denote metaphysical disjunctivism about the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences (what Haddock and Macpherson call ‘phenomenal disjunctivism’, rather than metaphysical disjunctivism about perceptual experiences more generally (what they call ‘experiential disjunctivism’).…”